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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 56 FEBRUARY 1958 No. 4 
THE PRACTICAL LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES 
Olin L. Browder, Jr.* 
EARLY in the development of the common law of convey-ancing, as everyone knows, the practice of physically consum-
mating a conveyance by acts on the land itself was abandoned in 
favor of the more flexible and convenient devices authorized or 
required by the Statute of Uses and the Statute of Frauds. Now we 
do it all on paper and consummate the transaction at any conven-
ient place. One of the requirements of this process is to make clear 
what land is being conveyed. So we describe the land on paper in 
one of the several ways which have been approved for this pur-
pose. The courts, with admirable liberality, have not specified 
that any particular sort of description is required, but only that 
it shall be possible, in some lawsuit brought for the purpose, 
for a court to decide, from the language used and perhaps from 
certain other extrinsic matter, just where the land described 
is located. But these more civilized refinements may have lost 
something of value which was of the essence of the cruder 
feoffment. And thereby hangs a tale which, by your leave, I 
mean to tell in this space. 
The rub comes in the unquestioned assumption that when you 
have done what is mentioned above you have done all that needs 
to be done for the expeditious, peaceable, and conclusive trans-
action of this sort of business. A paper description will be enough, 
to be sure, to tell you in a general way where your land lies. 
But anyone at all familiar with litigation over boundaries will 
know that, for a variety of reasons, few if any of these descrip-
tions admit of a single and precise application to the ground. It 
is this hiatus in our conveyancing practice between a deed de-
scribing land and the actual location on the ground of the bound-
aries described which causes most of our trouble over boundaries. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michlgan.-Ed. 
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How is this gap to be bridged? The proper time to bridge it 
is at the time of a conveyance. But under existing practices this 
is rarely done. What, then, is the situation of adjoining land-
owners whose respective deeds are consistent on paper? Either 
they are left without precise knowledge of their boundaries or, 
what is worse, their only way to a certain resolution of their 
doubts is by means of litigation. And even this may not be con-
clusive, but only the substitution of a paper decree for a paper 
description, leaving the gap still unbridged. All that such parties 
usually want is to know their boundaries, and at the beginning 
of their inquiry they are usually amicably inclined. Someone 
may tell them to have their lands surveyed, but of course this 
alone settles nothing. They do not want to quarrel about it, 
but we must tell them that if they want to be sure, they must 
begin a long and costly process which, if they are not quarreling 
at the beginning, will leave them quarreling at the end. If the 
consequences of these conditions have not been as deplorable 
as might be expected, the explanation no doubt lies in the fact 
that most people live out their lives not knowing their precise 
boundaries and not caring. But there are times when a matter 
of inches or of feet becomes a matter of some importance, which 
is usually when one of the parties proposes to make some im-
provement of his property. 
In certain long-settled areas boundary troubles are rare. So 
it is in England, which may be explained in part by the fact that 
most land-holdings are marked by fences, hedges, or walls of long 
standing and acceptance as boundaries. Much of our country, 
on the other hand, has not yet reached such a stabilized condition, 
and the continuing processes of subdivision in a rapidly growing 
society have sorely aggravated the problems inherent in our 
system of conveyancing. 
It is not surprising that under the circumstances mentioned 
parties will try to take their boundary problems into their own 
hands. Nor is it surprising that the American courts have been 
disposed to give legal sanction to such private arrangements in 
the furtherance of a declared policy of quieting peaceable posses-
sion a·.1d discouraging litigation. 
A traditional method for accomplishing such an objective is 
the doctrine of adverse possession. But the courts have not been 
willing to confine adjoining landowners to that doctrine. They 
have sought rather to evolve some principle which would bind 
such parties to a private, mutual designation of a boundary on 
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the ground so as to preclude any further question over its proper 
location. Not fully recognizing that the problem is probably 
sui generis, the courts have sought to adapt to their purpose sev-
eral disparate existing doctrines. This has led to disagreement 
and misunderstanding of the nature of the problem or the legal 
theory or theories which would -adequately explain or support 
judicial action. Vagueness of theory has led in turn to vagueness 
and disagreement on the facts which will merit judicial recogni-
tion. The result has been the growth of a gnarled and hoary knot 
upon this branch of the law of property. One who seeks to work 
his way into the core is tempted simply to lay bare a cross-
section of the mass for the exercise of students of legal method. 
But after more than a century of judicial groping through 
upwards of a thousand cases, without the benefit of any compre-
hensive legal scholarship beyond that which the courts them-
selves could afford, it is high time that someone attempted a sur-
vey of the cases, together with some definitive legal analysis. 
The reader should know that, in my effort to do this in an article 
of acceptable extent, it has been necessary to skim off for the 
footnotes only a small illustrative fraction of the mass of cases. 
He should be warned further of the dangers of deception in-
herent in such an undertaking. At this time I am able merely 
to spread before him the various solutions which have been 
offered to the problem, some of their ramifications, and some 
comment upon them. It will not do to assume that the cases cited 
represent the law in any of the respective jurisdictions, for in 
many of them other cases can be found which qualify or are in-
consistent with those cited. This suggests that any adequate 
appraisal of this law for the benefit of practitioners should 
include a survey of the cases on a state-by-state basis. Such a sur-
vey cannot be made at this time. 
No examination of the law of adverse possession in relation 
to boundary problems will be made, except to the extent re-
quired for an adequate analysis of other related doctrine. Nor 
is it necessary to do more than mention the undisputed recogni-
tion of the practical location of boundaries as evidence of their 
proper location where the applicable description is ambiguous.1 
The term "practical location" is used in this discussion as a 
lE.g., Day v. Stenger, 47 Idaho 253,274 P. 112 (1929); Mt. Carmel v. McCiintock, 155 
Ill. 608, 40 N.E. 829 (1895); Magoon v. Davis, 84 Me. 178, 24 A. 809 (1892); Lovejoy 
v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270 (1878); Lundgreen v. Stratton, 73 Wis. 659, 41 N.W. 1012 (1889). 
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generic term to refer to the several rules, other than adverse 
possession, which have been announced for the determination 
of boundaries on the ground. 
I. PAROL AGREEMENT 
It has been recognized by a majority of American courts that 
the determination of a boundary by what is called an oral "agree-
ment" between adjoining landowners will, according to various 
standards, become binding on them,2 and perhaps also on their 
successors in interest.3 The most obvious and orthodox example 
of this is the settlement of a boundary dispute by an agreement 
in the nature of an arbitration agreement. Evidently, however, 
not much use has been made of this device. It presupposes the 
compromise of a dispute and an express or implied agreement to 
be bound by the award,4 which in these cases will probably take 
the form of a designation of the boundary on the ground by 
the person chosen for this purpose. Some arbitration agreements 
2 Arkansas: Havlik v. Freeman, 214 Ark. 761, 218 S.W. (2d) 364 (1949); California: 
Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 95 P. 888 (1908); Connecticut: Rathbun v. Geer, 64 Conn. 
421, 30 A. 60 (1894); Delaware: Lindsay v. Springer, 4 Harr. (Del. Super.) 547 (1848); 
Florida: Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 S. 805 (1894); Georgia: Bunger v. Grimm, 
142 Ga. 448, 83 S.E. 200 (1914); Idaho: Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P. (2d) 351 
(1954); Illinois: Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N:E. (2d) 147 (1955); Indiana: 
Horton v. Brown, 130 Ind. 113, 29 N.E. 414 (1891); Iowa: Kitchen v. Chantland, 130 Iowa 
618, 105 N.W. 367 (1906); Kansas: Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607, 75 P. 1019 (1904); 
Kentucky: Garvin v. Threlkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092 (1917); Louisiana: Griffin v. 
Mahoney, (La. App. 1951) 56 S.W. (2d) 208; Michigan: Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 
227, 209 N.W. 169 (1926); Minnesota: Beardsley v. Crane, 52 -Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740 
(1893); Mississippi: Archer v. Helm, 69 Miss. 730, 11 S. 3 (1892); Missouri: Journey v. 
Vikturek, 8 S.W. (2d) 975 (1928); Montana: Box Elder Livestock Co. v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 
561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); Nebraska: Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903); New 
Hampshire: Gray v. Berry, 9 N.H. 473 (1838); New Mexico: Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch 
Co., 17 N.M. 246, 134 P. 228 (1912); New York: Vosburgh v. Teator, 32 N.Y. 561 (1865}; 
North Dakota: Bichler v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185 (1933); Ohio: Bobo v. Rich-
mond, 25 Ohio St. 115 (1874); Oregon: Lennox v. Hendricks, 11 Ore. 33, 4 P. 515 (1883); 
Pennsylvania: Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •327 (1817); Rhode Island: Aldrich v. 
Brownell, 45 R.I. 142, 120 A. 582 (1923); South Carolina: Davis v. Elmore, 40 S.C. 533, 19 
S.E. 204 (1893); Tennessee: Houston v. Matthews, 9 Tenn. 116 (1826); Texas: Bailey v. 
Baker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) 23 S.W. 454; Utah: Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45 Utah 612, 
148 P. 360 (1915); Vermont: Burnell v. Maloney, 39 Vt. 579 (1867); Washington: 
Egleski v. Strozyk, 121 Wash. 398, 209 P. 708 (1922); West Virginia: Gwynn v. 
Schwartz, 32 W. Va. 487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889); Wisconsin: Peters v. Reichenbach, 114 Wis. 
209, 90 N.W. 184 (1902). See dicta, South Dakota: Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195 at 209, 169 
N.W. 518 (1918); Wyoming: Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491 at 500, 236 P. 517 (1925). 
In the following cases the acceptability of boundary agreements is not made entirely clear: 
Maine: Bemis v. Bradley, 126 Me. 462, 139 A. 593 (1927); Oklahoma: Lake v. Crosser, 
202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950). 
3 See Part V, "Status of Subsequent Purchasers" infra. 
~Pionke v. Washburn, 176 Wis. 417, 186 N.W. 1012 (1922). 
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which have been upheld have been in writing.5 In Massachusetts, 
where the submission was to referees under a rule of court, the 
awards were held binding,6 but otherwise an oral submission was 
not binding.7 Although there is other authority to the same 
effect,8 oral submissions have been upheld.9 It is said that the 
Statute of Frauds is not a bar because the undertaking does not 
create new rights, but only establishes existing ones.10 
The great mass of judicially enforced boundary agreements, 
however, have not involved anything like a submission to arbitra-
tion. It is the conduct of the parties themselves, rather than that 
of an arbitrator, which fixes the boundary. The nature and cir-
cumstances of such agreements are without exact parallel or 
clear analogy elsewhere in the law. The requirements which 
the courts have laid down for them relate, for the most part, 
either to the pre-existing conditions out of which an agreement 
can be made or to the acts which must follow the agreement 
if it is to affect a boundary. Very little has been said about what 
facts will constitute the agreement itself. 
The Requirement of Uncertainty 
It is a universally accepted requirement that no binding 
agreement can be made unless it is made to resolve an "un-
certainty" regarding the location of a boundary. This require-
ment is variously phrased in terms of the boundary being un-
certain, unascertained, unsettled, doubtful, indefinite, or that 
there is an "honest difficulty"11 or "room for controversy."12 
But what or who must be uncertain? Is the reference made to 
an objective state of facts or to the state of mind of the parties? 
Acceptance of the former criterion is indicated by statements 
5 Forguson v. Newton, 212 Ky. 92, 278 S.W. 602 (1925); Gaylord v. Gaylord, 48 N.C. 
367 (1856); Rottman v. Toft, 187 Wis. 558, 204 N.W. 585 (1925). Cf. Wilson v. Stork, 171 
Wis. 561, 177 N.W. 878 (1920), which seems to hold that a mistake in the survey vitiates 
its effect. 
6 Searle v. Abbe, 79 Mass. 409 (1859); Goodridge v. Dustin, 46 Mass. 363 (1842). 
7 Whitney v. Holmes, 15 Mass. 152 (1818). 
s Camp v. Camp, 59 Vt. 667 (1887). 
9 Smith v. Seitz, 87 Conn. 678, 89 A. 257 (1914); Jones v. Dewey, 17 N.H. 596 (1845); 
Bowen v. Cooper, 7 Watts (47 Pa.) 311 (1838). The following were arbitration cases in 
fact, although the courts did not treat them strictly on that basis: Box Elder Livestock 
Co. v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); Vosburgh v. Teator, 32 N.Y. 561 (1865). 
10 Smith v. Seitz, 87 Conn. 678, 89 A. 257 (1914). 
11 Smith v. Hamilton, 20 Mich. 433 (1870). 
12 Shiver v. Hill, 148 Ga. 616, 97 S.E. 676 (1918). 
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that a boundary is certain which can be made certain, 13 or is 
readily ascertainable, 14 or that the requirement is not met if 
the parties made no effort to find the line;15 or, if a line is marked 
on the ground, mere doubt about it is not enough.16 .One court 
said that a line is not uncertain merely because it had never been 
run.17 Another even seems to require that the uncertainty must 
appear from the face of a deed or from an attempt by survey to 
apply the description to the ground.18 These courts are not con-
scious of the illusory nature of an objective standard of uncer-
tainty where a boundary has not been judicially established. 
Other courts are equally insistent that the requirement is met 
even though the line is alleged to be readily ascertainable,19 or 
because its ascertainment would entail considerable trouble and 
expense.20 One court recently said that the requirement is merely 
that the parties not know where the true line is.21 In the great 
majority of the cases the requirement is merely stated in terms 
of one or more of the various labels, with perhaps a finding that 
the requirement was satisfied in the particular case, but without 
any effort to explain what is meant by it.22 
There is some indication that the uncertainty requirement 
is imposed to supply consideration for a boundary agreement. As 
in the case of an agreement for arbitration, consideration exists 
where there is a dispute about a boundary which the agreement is 
intended to resolve. Indeed there are a few cases which indicate 
that nothing less than a dispute will suffice to support a bound-
ary agreement.23 
13 Meacci v. Kochergen, 141 Cal. App. (2d) 207, 296 P. (2d) 573 (1956). 
14 Cienki v. Rusnak, 398 Ill. 77, 75 N.'E. (2d) 372 (1947); George v. Collins, 72 W. Va. 
25, 77 S.E. 356 (1913). 
15 Skinner v. Francisco, 404 Ill. 356, 88 N.E. (2d) 867 (1949); Lennox v. Hendricks, 
11 Ore. 33, 4 P. 515 (1883). 
16 Lewallen v. Overton, 28 Tenn. 76 (1848). 
17 Burnell v. Maloney, 39 Vt. 579 (1867). 
18 Elofrson v. Lindsay, 90 Wis. 203, 63 N.W. 89 (1895); Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 
285, 18 N.W. 175 (1884). 
19 Galbraith v. Lunsford, 87 Tenn. 89 (1888); Harn v. Smith, 79 Tex. 310, 15 S.W. 
240 (1891); Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 175 P. (2d) 718 (1946). 
20 Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903). 
21 Madera School District v. Maggiorini, 146 Cal. App. (2d) 390, 303 P. (2d) 803 (1956). 
Cf. Hunt v. Devling, 8 Watts (48 Pa.) 403 (1839). 
22 Cf. K.laar v. Lemperis, (Mo. 1957) 303 S.W. (2d) 55, where the court said that the 
parties were not uncertain, and the only doubt was in the mind of a prospective purchaser 
from one of them. 
23 Brock v. Muse, 232 Ky. 293, 22 S.W. (2d) 1034 (1929); De Long v. Baldwin, 111 
Mich. 466, 69 N.W. 831 (1897); Le Comte v. Freshwater, 56 W. Va. 336, 49 S.E. 238 (1904); 
Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 285, 18 N.W. 175 (1884). 
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Most courts, however, seem to be more concerned with the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds than the need for considera-
tion. There is no appreciable authority for allowing adjoining 
landowners to adjust or alter their boundaries by oral agreement. 
It is generally agreed, therefore, that if the parties, or one of 
them, "know" where the true line is,24 or, not knowing, they 
know that their agreed line is not the true line,25 their agreement 
is not valid.26 A disputed boundary, on the other hand, can be 
the basis for a valid agreement, by analogy to an arbitration 
agreement, which, as indicated above, is not regarded as con-
stituting a conveyance of any land. In like manner, most courts 
are willing to uphold an agreement which does not resolve a 
boundary dispute, provided that it does resolve a pre-existing 
uncertainty about a boundary. But any arrangement between 
the parties which has the effect of fixing a line different from 
that which a proper application of their title papers would re-
quire is in a sense an informal transfer of land. What is the ulti-
mate test for distinguishing between a transaction which falls 
under the Statute of Frauds and one which the courts will sus-
tain as a boundary agreement? No clear definition of the present 
requirement will be possible until a clearer picture emerges of 
the nature of this unusual sort of transaction, and until the per-
vading effects of what may be called the "mistake rule" have 
been examined. 
Post-Agreement Requirements 
Most of the courts which recognize boundary agreements in-
sist that certain circumstances must exist following an agreement 
before it can be regarded as binding, or determinative of the 
boundary. But the courts are not agreed on the nature of such 
circumstances, and they are vague about the reasons for requiring 
24. Lewis v. Ogram, 149 Cal. 505, 87 P. 60 (1906); Smith v. Lanier, 199 Ga. 255, 34 
S.E. (2d) 91 (1945); Kunkle v. Clinkingbeard, 66 Idaho 493, 162 P. (2d) 892 (1945); Wright 
v. Hendricks, 388 Ill. 431, 58 N.E. (2d) 453 (1944); Peterson v. Hollis, 90 Kan. 655, 136 
P. 258 (1913); ·Duff v. Turner, 201 Ky. 501, 256 S.W. 1105 (1923); Thoman v. Gross, 148 
Mich. 505, 112 N.W. Ill (1907); Volkart v. Groom, (Mo. 1928) 9 S.W. (2d) 947. Contra: 
Tate v. Foshee, 117 Ind. 322, 20 N.E. 241 (1889). Cf. Gray v. Berry, 9 N.H. 473 (1838), 
where a second agreement was allowed to supersede a prior agreement. 
25 Loverkamp v. Loverkamp, 381 Ill. 467, 45 N.E. (2d) 871 (1942); Voigt v. Hunt, 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S.W. 745. 
26 Contra: Bobo v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St. 115 (1874). See Stutsman v. State, 67 N.D. 
618 at 624, 275 N.W. 387 (1937). But note that the Ohio court requires acquiescence for 
the statutory period after an agreement. In the Bobo case it was indicated that the 
result was one of estoppel. 
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them. In several cases it is indicated, but not beyond doubt, that 
such an agreement is binding when made.27 A number of courts 
have held that such agreements are binding if "executed" by 
physical manifestations of the agreement on the ground.28 Exe-
cution will often take place by the erection of a fence, but other 
acts, including a change of possession, will suffice. A still larger 
body of authority requires that the agreement be followed by 
acquiescence in it or possession consistent with it for an undefined 
period of time which, however, may be less than the period of 
the statute of limitations for adverse possession.29 At the other 
end of the spectrum are the views of the Ohio30 and possibly 
the Washington31 courts that a boundary agreement becomes bind-
ing only after acquiescence in it for the statutory period; or the 
position of the Wisconsin court, asserting a special sort of estoppel 
and requiring that valuable improvements be made in reliance 
on the agreement.32 Account should be taken of the blurring effect 
of other cases, if the emphasis is placed on the facts of those cases 
rather than on the language of the courts. Cases which state no 
requirement of acquiescence, for example, or permit acquiescence 
for less than the statutory period, may show in fact that there was 
27 Davis v. 'Elmore, 40 S.C. 533, 19 S.E. 204 (1893); Houston v. Matthews, 9 Tenn. 
116 (1826). Cf. Wilson v. Hudson, 16 Tenn. 398 (1835); Davis v. Jones, 40 Tenn. 603 (1859). 
28Lindsay v. Springer, 4 Harr. (Del. Super.) 547 (1848); Bunger v. Grimm, 142 
Ga. 448, 83 S.E. 200 (1914); Tate v. Foshee, 117 Ind. 332, 20 N.E. 241 (1889); Garvin v. 
T•hrelkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092 (1917); Journey v. Vikturek, (Mo. 1928) 8 S.W. 
(2d) 975; Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903); Gray v. iBerry, 9 N.H. 473 
(1838); Bowen v. Cooper, 7 Watts (47 Pa.) 311 (1838); Aldrich v. Brownell, 45 R.I. 142, 
120 A. 582 (1923); Bailey v. Baker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) 23 S.W. 454; Gwynn v. Schwartz, 
32 W. Va. 487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889). Archer v. Helm, 69 Miss. 730, 11 S. 3 (1892), may be in 
accord, but it is not clear whether the agreement is executed upon taking possession, or 
whether such possession must continue for some period. 
29 Havlik v. Freeman, 214 Ark. 761, 218 S.W. (2d) 364 (1949); Watrous v. Morrison, 
33 Fla. 261, 14 S. 805 (1894); Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P. (2d) 351 (1954); 
Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N.E. (2d) 147 (1955); Kitchen v. Chantland, 
130 Iowa 618, 105 N.W. 367 (1906); Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Ran. 607, 75 P. 1019 (1904); 
Griffin v. Mahoney, (La. App. 1951) 56 S. (2d) 208; Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 
209 N.W. 169 (1926); Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740 (1893); Box Elder 
Livestock Co. v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch 
Co., 17 N.M. 246, 134 P. 228 (1912); Bichler v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185 (1933); 
Lake v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950); Lennox v. Hendricks, 11 Ore. 33, 
4 P. 515 (1883). See Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195 at 210, 169 N.W. 518 (1918). The following 
may be to the same effect, although the courts have not made themselves entirely clear 
on the point: Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 27 P. 931 (1891); Knowles v. Toothaker, 
58 Me. 172 (1870); Vosburgh v. Teator, 32 N.Y. 561 (1865); Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 
491, 236 P. 517 (1925). Cf. Loustalot v. McKee!, 157 Cal. 634, 108 P. 707 (1910). 
30 Bobo v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St. 115 (1874). 
31 Egleski v. Strozyk, 121 Wash. 398, 209 P. 708 (1922). 
32 Peters ".· Reichenbach, 114 Wis. 209, 90 N.W. 184 (1902). 
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acquiescence for the statutory period or substantial changes of 
position.33 
It is odd that several courts have indicated that a boundary 
agreement which becomes binding when "executed" may later 
be abrogated by abandonment34 or by a later agreement.35 
A few courts have not yet indicated what post-agreement re-
quirements will be imposed.36 There is almost a total lack of 
explanation for imposing one such requirement rather than an-
other, or for imposing such a requirement at all. 
The Nature and Theory of Boundary Agreements 
The courts have prescribed certain pre-existing conditions for 
such agreements, as well as certain post-agreement requirements, 
but there is a general vagueness in the opinions about just what 
it is that takes place when such an agreement is made. In those 
few cases where the agreement is essentially one of arbitration, 
its essential features are obvious. But most of these transactions 
are not contractual in the sense of involving anything that is 
executory or promissory. The agreement, rather than looking to 
the future, refers to an existing fact, a line somehow designated 
on the ground, and amounts to a recognition or acceptance of 
that line as a boundary. Commonly such assent follows a survey, 
which is strikingly different from the arbitration-type of agree-
ment, which calls for a survey or other factual determination in 
the future. But a survey is nowhere imposed as a requirement, 
and less formal or reliable bases for agreement are to be found 
in the cases. There is indeed some conflict, as indicated in the 
discussion of the uncertainty requirement, on whether the parties 
need make any effort to ascertain their true boundary. 
Commonly the required acceptance of or assent to a line on 
the ground is manifested by express verbal statements by the 
parties. We are rarely told just what was said, but merely that 
the parties "agreed." There is nothing to indicate that this must 
ss Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 S. 805 (1894); Kitchen v. Chantland, 130 
Iowa 618, 105 N.W. 367 (1906); McBeth v. White, 122 Kan. 637, 253 P. 212 (1927); Shafer 
v. Leigh, 112 Kan. 14, 209 P. 830 (1922); Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch Co., 17 N.M. 
246, 134 P. 228 (1912); Aldrich v. Brownell, 45 R.I. 142, 120 A. 582 (1923). 
84Brummell v. Harris, 162 Mo. 397, 63 S.W. 497 (1901); Kellum v. Smith, 65 Pa. 
86 (1870). 
SIS Gray v. Berry, 9 N.H. 473 (1838). 
86 Horton v. Brown, 130 Ind. ll3, 29 N.E. 414 (1891); J3emis v. Bradley, 126 Me. 
462, 139 A. 593 (1927); Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45 Utah 612, 148 P. 360 (1915); Burnell v. 
Maloney, 39 Vt. 579 (1867). 
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be done in any particular way or at any particular time or place, 
or that it must be done by one party in the other's presence, or 
that they must do it at the same time. Clearly mutuality of assent 
or recognition will be insisted on. 37 
The necessary assent which is called an agreement may be 
manifested by conduct as well as by words.38 In fact it is seldom 
that one will find parties standing on their respective parcels and, 
in something of the manner of a feoffment, solemnly declaring in 
each other's presence that they thereby accept a line on the 
ground as a boundary. Boundary agreements grow out of the 
innumerable combinations of speech and conduct to be found 
when parties confer or do the various acts which neighbors often 
do in respect to their common boundary. Such circumstances may 
fairly bristle with implications of intention, and it is inevitable 
that courts will draw inferences, or allow juries to do so, for or 
against the existence of an agreement. Some of the more common 
acts are equivocal in their significance. Such is the erection of 
fences or similar barriers. Since these may be built for reasons 
other than to mark boundaries, evidence of such other purpose 
will defeat an inference of agreement. 39 So also may evidence 
that one or both of the parties understood that the agreement was 
to be provisional or conditional on the existence or occurrence 
of some other fact.40 Although the question has not been specifi-
cally ruled on, presumably the intention behind such equivocal 
acts can be proved by testimony of the parties in a lawsuit over 
the validity of the agreement. 
Because of the legal effect given to these agreements, an 
obvious requirement is imposed that an agreement can affect 
only a common boundary between parcels owned by the parties.41 
37 Gregory v. Jones, 212 Ark. 443, 206 S.W. (2d) 18 (1947). Cf. Tietjen v. Dobson, 
170 Ga. 123, 152 S.E. 222 (1930), where, although the initial agreement was mutual the 
erection of a fence as required to execute it was done by one party without the knowledge 
of the other. 
38Ernsting v. Gleason, 137 Mo. 594, 39 S.W. 70 (1897); Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N.D. 
549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931); Pickett v. Nelson, 71 Wis. 542, 37 N.W. 836 (1888); Carstensen 
v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 IP. 517 (1925). 
89 Ackerman v. Ryder, 308 Mo. 9, 271 S.W. 743 (1925); Satchell v. :Dunsmoor, 179 
Ore. 463, 172 P. (2d) 826 (1946); Ungaro v. Mete, 68 R.I. 419, 27 A. (2d) 826 (1942); 
Lacy v. Bartlett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 78 S.W. (2d) 219; Wood v. Webb, 148 Wash. 161, 
268 P. 150 (1928). 
40 Oliver v. Daniel, 202 Ga. 149, 42 S.E. (2d) 363 (1947); Krider v. Milner, 99 Mo. 145, 
12 S.W. 461 (1889); Campbell Banking Co. v. Hamilton, (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 210 S.W. 
621; Railsback v. Bowers, (Mo. 1923) 257 S.W. 119, where a later survey, ignored by the 
parties, showed that the agreed line was not tentative. 
41 Crowell v. Maughs, 7 Ill. 419 (1845), where ownership on both sides was in the 
1958] LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES 497 
Theoretical explanation by the courts of the nature of bound-
ary agreements rarely goes beyond answering the argument that 
insofar as an agreement calls for a boundary other than that 
which the relevant documents of title would prescribe it 
amounts to an oral conveyance contrary to the Statute of 
Frauds. Reference has already been made to the occasional as-
sumption by the courts that boundary agreements are analogous 
to agreements for the arbitration of boundary disputes and for 
this reason they escape the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, 
provided the requirement of uncertainty is satisfied.42 In view 
of the differences that have been noted between arbitration agree-
ments and the more typical boundary agreements, however, there 
may be a question whether the enforcement of the latter is best 
explained in contractual terms. At any rate, about all that most 
courts say in answer to the argument against parol conveyances 
is that a proper boundary agreement does not operate by way of 
conveyance but only by way of defining or locating on the ground 
the existing titles of the parties.43 This answer also, on first 
thought, may not seem sufficient, but it contains, I believe, the 
germ of the real explanation of what the courts are trying to do 
in these cases and why they are doing it, a fuller elaboration of 
which is offered below.44 It may be said here that this answer 
at least has the practical advantage of preserving the integrity 
of the muniments of title. There is no need to adjust paper de-
scriptions according to agreed locations where the latter are re-
government; Merrill v. Hilliard, 59 N.H. 481 (1879); Rogers v. White, 33 Tenn. 68 
(1853). 
42 See Gibson, J, in Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •327 at •331 (1817). 
43 Hoyer v. Edwards, 182 Ark. 624, 32 S.W. (2d) 812 (1930); Berghoefer v. Frazier, 
150 Ill. 577, 37 N.E. 914 (1894); Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607, 75 P. 1019 (1904); 
Garvin v. Threlkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092 (1917); Archer v. Helm, 69 Miss. 730, 
11 S. 3 (1892); Hitchcock v. Libby, 70 N.H. 399, 47 A. 269 (1900); Gwynn v. Schwartz, 
32 W.Va. 487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889). 
This idea early appeared in Penn v. Lord Baltimore, I Ves. Sr. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 
1132 (1750), which was a portent of the problem that was to harass the American courts. 
A controversy arose between the heirs of William Penn and Lord Baltimore over the 
boundaries between "their provinces" (Pennsylvania and Maryland). An agreement had 
been entered providing for the settlement by drawing certain lines and directing how 
they were to ,be run and for commissioners to do the running. Specific performance 
of the agreement was decreed in this suit. Chancellor Hardwicke said that this controversy 
was "of a nature worthy of the judicature of a Roman senate rather than of a single 
judge." He also declared, "To say that such a settlement of boundaries amounts to an 
alienation, is not the true idea of it; for if fairly made, without collusion (which cannot 
be presumed), the boundaries so settled are to be presumed to be the true and ancient 
limits." 27 Eng. Rep. at 1135. 
44 See Part VI, "T,he .Meaning of Practical Location," infra. 
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garded as but practical constructions of the former: 45 There is 
some indication that the Iowa court believes that the Statute 
of Frauds is involved, but is avoided by possession in accordance 
with the agreement.46 
It is scarcely surprising that someone would think of estoppel 
in this connection. Of course such an explanation is particularly 
indicated where the agreements are binding only if improvements 
are made in relian~e upon them.47 This is explained as a special 
kind of estoppel, confined to cases of this sort, and not requiring 
any express representations. But there are other references to 
estoppel where the ordinary requirements therefor are not pres-
ent, and where it may be inferred that the courts were simply 
yielding to the common temptation to make estoppel serve to 
cover a lack of more precise analysis.48 
One court was willing to bring its declared policy directly 
to bear without borrowing any theoretical catalysts, saying that 
convenience, policy, necessity, and justice unite in favor of en-
forcing such amicable agreements.49 
Effect of Mistake 
The frustration experienced in searching through the cases 
for a clear idea of the nature and theory of boundary agreements 
or the meaning of the requirement of uncertainty may be caused 
in part by a corollary rule of startling and far-reaching implica-
tions. A large proportion of the courts which have approved the 
practical location of boundaries by parol agreement have declared 
that, under certain circumstances, if such a location is founded on 
a mistaken belief as to the location of the true line, the agree-
ment is not binding.50 It would be preposterous to say that every 
45 See especially Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 95 P. 888 (1908). 
46 Kitchen v. Chantland, 130 Iowa 618, 105 N.W. 367 (1906). Cf. Stevenson v. Robuck, 
179 Iowa 461, 161 N.W. 462 (1917); Fredricksen v. Bierent, 154 Iowa 34, 134 N.W. 432 
(1912); Uker v. Thieman, 132 Iowa 79, 107 N.W. 167 (1906). 
47 Gove v. White, 20 Wis. 425 (1866). See also Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218 (1876); 
St. :Bede College v. Weber, 168 Ill. 324, 48 N.E. 165 (1897), where there was a building 
in conformity to the agreement, although this fact was not emphasized. 
48Berghoefer v. Frazier, 150 Ill. 577, 37 N.'E. 914 (1894); Adams v. Betz, 167 Ind. 
161, 78 N.E. 649 (1906); Edwards v. Fleming, 83 Kan. 653, 112 P. 836 (1911); Griffin v. 
Mahoney, (La. App. 1951) 56 S. (2d) 208; Terry v. Chandler, 16 N.Y. 354 (1857); Rutledge 
v. Presbyterian Church, 3 Ohio App. 177 (1914); Wilson v. Hudson, 16 Tenn. 398 (1835). 
49 Levy v. >Maddox, 81 Tex. 210, 16 S. W. 877 (1891). Cf. Box Elder Livestock Co. 
v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920), where the court said that an agreement was 
the best way of determining a .true boundary and tends to prevent litigation. 
r;o Schraeder Mining Co. v. Packer, 129 U.S. 688 (1888); Short v. Mauldin, (Ark. 
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agreement on a line which was later proved not to be the true 
line was void, for then no such agreement could have any inde-
pendent significance.51 The courts have not said this, and evi-
dently they do not mean it. One court seems to be using by 
analogy the mistake rule which many courts apply to adverse 
possession. If the parties possess according to a line which they 
accept as the true line but claiming only to the true line, they 
are not bound if the former is proved not to be the true line.52 
Several other courts, although speaking in terms of mistake, really 
seem to be objecting to an agreement because it was not made to 
resolve a dispute over the boundary.53 But most courts would 
not explain the mistake rule in such terms as these. They some-
times say merely that it is the mistaken attempt by the parties to 
find the true line which deprives the agreed line of legal signifi-
cance. 54 If this is not me.aningful, it has sometimes been said that 
the acceptable alternative to a mere attempt to find the true line 
is that the parties shall have agreed to adopt an unascertained or 
disputed line55 or shall have. sought to "establish" a line.56 
The sort of agreement which would most obviously avoid 
the difficulty which seems to be bothering the courts at this point 
is the arbitration-type of agreement, where the parties settle a 
dispute over their boundary by agreement to have their line run 
and to be bound by it.57 Such an agreement could be supported 
1956) 296 S.W. (2d) 197; Sonnemann v. Mertz, 221 Ill. 362, 77 N.E. 550 (1906); Kyte v. 
Chessmore, 106 Kan. 394, 188 P. 251 (1920); Skaggs v. Skaggs, 212 Ky. 836, 280 S.W. 
150 (1926); Bemis v. Bradley, 126 Me. 462, 139 A. 593 (1927); Blank v. Ambs, 260 Mich. 
589, 245 N.W. 525 (1932); :Benz v. St. Paul, 89 Minn. 31, 93 N.W. 1038 (1903); Klaar v. 
Lemperis, (Mo. 1957) 303 S.W. (2d) 55; Kimes v. Libby, 87 Neb. 113, 126 N.W. 869 
(1910); Lake v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 ·P. (2d) 583 (1950). The following possibly 
may be to the same effect: Teasley v. Roberson, 149 Miss. 188, 115 S. 211 (1928); Lennox 
v. Hendricks, 11 Ore. 33, 4 P. 515 (1883); Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518 
(1918); Burnell v. Maloney, 39 Vt. 579 (1867); Pickett v. Nelson, 79 Wis. 9, 47 
N.W. 936 (1891). See Small v. Robbins, 33 Nev. 288 at 300, 110 P. 1128 (1910). Cf. Coon 
v. Smith, 29 N.Y. 392 (1864); Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •327 (1817); Rocher v. 
Williams, 183 Okla. 221, 80 P. (2d) 649 (1938), where the court said that mistake would 
defeat an agreement, but not after acquiescence had continued for the statutory period. 
51See Gibson, J, in Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •325 at •331 (1817).• 
52 Chostner v. Schrock, (Mo. 1933) 64 S.W. (2d) 664; Barnes v. Allison, 166 Mo. 96, 
65 S.W. 781 (1901). See also Hatfield v. Workman, 35 W.Va. 578, 14 S.E. 153 (1891). 
5S Skaggs v. Skaggs, 212 Ky. 836, 280 S.W. 150 (1926); De Long v. Baldwin, 111 Mich. 
466, 69 N.W. 831 (1897); Hatfield v. Workman, 35 W.Va. 578, 14 S.E. 153 (1891). 
54 Kyte v. Chesmore, 106 Kan. 394, 188 P. 251 (1920); Blank v. Ambs, 260 Mich. 
589, 245 N.W. 525 (1932); Benz v. St. Paul, 89 Minn. 31, 93 N.W. 1038 (1903); Patton v. 
Smith, 171 ,Mo. 231, 71 S.W. 187 (1902). 
55 Sonnemann v. Mertz, 221 Ill. 362, 77 N.E. 550 (1906). 
56 Bemis v. !Bradley, 126 'Me. 462, 139 A. 593 (1927). 
57 But cf. Wilson v. Stork, 171 Wis. 561, 177 N.W. 878 (1920), which seems to hold 
that mistake vitiates the agreement even in this situation. 
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where the parties are not disputing but are only "uncertain" 
about their line, as long as they could be said to have conclusively 
submitted the question to determination by survey or otherwise. 
But most of the boundary-agreement cases do not involve this 
sort of undertaking. As has been seen, it is often only after a line 
has been run, with varying degrees of formality, that the parties 
"agree" to accept the line as their boundary. In this situation what 
meaning can there be to the distinction between agreeing to 
establish a line and merely seeking to find the true line? It may 
be assumed that every acceptable boundary agreement is founded 
on some effort to find the true line or on an assumption as to its 
location. Surely it is not the fact that the parties sought to find 
the true line which vitiates their agreement. References to sev-
eral decisions and dicta may better serve to reveal the distinction 
which many courts may have apprehended but have riot yet made 
articulate. 
The Nebraska court in one case applied the mistake rule 
where the parties, after a survey, had agreed to accept the sur-
veyed line;58 but in another case it seemed that after a su,rvey had 
been made, there still remained some uncertainty, of which the 
parties were aware, about the location of the true line, and they 
nevertheless agreed on the surveyed line rather than go to the 
trouble and expense which the court said would have been re-
quired finally to resolve the doubt.59 In the latter case the agreed 
boundary was approved. The Oklahoma court, in one of its lead-
ing cases, 60 approved an agreement which it said was made to 
avoid the expense of a survey. The court also said that the parties 
acted knowing that the line agreed on might not be the true line. 
The implication is clear that if they had agreed on a surveyed line 
on the assumption that the survey had located the true line, 
subsequent proof that the true line was elsewhere would have 
vitiated their agreement. One hundred fifty years ago, Justice 
Gibson, speaking for the Pennsylvania court in Perkins v. Gay,61 
58 Kimes v. Libby, 87 Neb. 113, 126 N.W. 869 (1910). 
59 Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903). 
60 Lake v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950). 
613 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •327 at •331 (1817): "It was laid down in general terms, that if, 
at the time of an agreement to establish a consentable line, as we technically call it, 
the parties labour under a mistake as to their respective rights, they will not be bound. 
To this doctrine I do not assent; no boundary of the sort could in any case prevail, 
if it were law, for the consideration of the agreement, is, in ninety-nine cases out of a 
hundred, the settlement of a dispute arising from ignorance and misapprehension of 
right on both sides. If, to prevent irritation until the true line be ascertained, a temporary 
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presented a fuller analysis of this problem than has since appeared 
in any other case. His statement is not free from ambiguity, but 
after rejecting the argument that mistake generally defeats a 
"consentable line" (that court's term for an agreed boundary), 
he did say in effect that where the parties proceed on the basis 
that the subject of the agreement is doubtful, and take account 
of the risk that each must assume as a consequence of that doubt, 
their agreement will be binding notwithstanding any mistake. 
Something of the same idea seems to be expressed by Smith, J, 
speaking for the Arkansas court in the most recent case in that 
state on the subject.62 He put the distinction in terms of "con-
scious" and "unconscious" mistake. In the former case the parties 
assume the risk that the agreed line may not coincide with the 
true line.63 But an unconscious mistake vitiates the agreement. 
Attempting to summarize these observations, it appears that 
the courts may wish to require that one of the essential features 
of agreements which call for arbitration shall also be present in 
those agreements which do not; that in the latter case, while it is 
the conduct of the parties themselves, rather than that of an arbi-
trator or surveyor, which determines the location of the line, they 
must intend or be aware that what they are doing is to settle that 
which until the moment of their agreement remained in some 
doubt. If what they have done before their agreement convinces 
them that they have found the true line, and they agree to it 
on that basis but are later proved to have been mistaken, their 
agreement is not binding. They must either not have tried very 
boundary, predicated on the avowed ignorance of the parties, be established, to a full 
understanding that it is not to be permanent; there is no doubt it will not have effect 
beyond the terms of the agreement. So if the parties, from misapprehension, adjust their 
fences, and exercise acts of ownership, in conformity with a line which turns out not 
to be the true boundary; or permission be ignorantly given to place a fence on the land 
of the party, this will not amount to an agreement, or be binding as the assent of the 
parties; and I agree it is a principle of equity, that the parties to an agreement must 
be acquainted with the extent of their rights and the nature of the information they 
can call for respecting them, else they will not be bound. The reason is, that they proceed 
under an idea that the fact which is the inducement to the agreement, is in a particular 
way, and give their assent, not absolutely, but on conditions that are falsefied by the 
event •••. But where the parties treat upon a basis that the fact which is the subject 
of the agreement is doubtful, and the consequent risk each is to encounter is taken into 
consideration in the stipulations assented to, the contract will ,be valid notwithstanding 
any mistake of one of the parties, provided there be no concealment or unfair dealing 
by the opposite party, that would affect any other contract.'' 
62 Short v. Mauldin, (Ark. 1956) 296 S.W. (2d) 197 at 198. Cf. Peebles v. Starnes, 208 
Ark. 834, 188 S.W. (2d) 289 (1945), where an agreement without a survey was upheld. 
63 Cf. Peters v. Reichenbach, 114 Wis. 209, 90 N.W. 184 (1902). 
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hard to find their line, or having tried, they must still remain in 
doubt about having found it before it can be said that they have 
"established" a line and have not merely tried to find it. 
Such a doctrine may reflect the courts' fear of catching the 
parties in a trap of their own setting and their reluctance to give 
legal sanction to the informal acts of parties unless they under-
stand the full import of what they are doing.64 It may also re-
flect the tacit influence of a contract rationale: the necessity for 
some semblance of consideration, which can be found here only 
to the extent that each of the parties consciously surrenders a 
potential claim to assert a boundary different from the one agreed 
on. If the mistake rule is stated in terms of the requirement of un-
certainty-and this is sometimes done-it would mean that the 
required uncertainty refers to the state of mind of the parties and 
must continue until the very moment of the agreement. When ap-
plied for such a purpose, the requirement of uncertainty shifts 
from its role as a safeguard against parol conveyances and serves 
to insure that boundary agreements are supported by consider-
ation. 
It may be pertinent to inquire whether the mistake rule, ex-
plained in terms of a consideration requirement, is soun4 in the 
light of what is or should be the purpose of boundary agreements 
and the policy that is served by them. Does this explanation of 
the rule, in other words, demonstrate the danger of trying to ex-
plain the real objectives of these transactions in contractual terms? 
Further comment on this point appears below.65 
In attempting to administer the mistake rule as it has been 
interpreted herein, it will be seen that the courts are left to face 
a kind of Scylla-and-Charybdis operation. If a survey or prelimi-
nary investigation by the parties has convinced them of the loca-
. tion of the true line, they cannot deliberately disregard it and 
adopt another, lest they violate the requirement of uncertainty 
and fail for having tried to transfer land informally. But neither 
in such a case can they adopt such a line with binding effect if it is 
later proved that their conviction about its location was mis-
taken. One might wonder what a court would do with a case in 
which the parties agreed on a line other than the one which they 
believed was the true line, but it turned out that neither the line 
64 Comment will be made later on the justification for such a fear. See Part VI, 
"Tthe Meaning of Practical Location," infra. 
115 Ibid. 
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they agreed on nor the one they disregarded was the true line. At 
any rate, where the mistake rule is applied with the meaning 
above indicated, the area in which parties can fix their bounda-
ries by informal agreement is confined within very narrow 
bounds. The room for agreement is even more restricted if a 
court holds that the requirement of uncertainty is not met where 
the parties have not made some minimal effort to find the true 
line.611 Here the parties must make some effort to find the true 
line or their agreement will fail for want of compliance with the 
requirement of uncertainty and a resulting violation of the Stat-
ute of Frauds; but if such efforts reach the point of convincing 
them erroneously that they have found the true line, and they 
agree on that basis, their agreement will fail because of mistake, 
which also may be explained in terms of the uncertainty require-
ment, but which is applied in this instance as a requirement of 
consideration. 
In trying to appraise the effect of the mistake rule in the 
boundary agreement cases, some uncertainty must be attributed 
to the failure of some courts to make clear what they mean oy 
mistake, and whether they would interpret it as it has been in-
terpreted herein. So long as the requirement is undefined, room 
is left for a court to throw out any agreement on the ground that 
the agreed line was founded on a mistake of fact. Even where 
mistake is defined as indicated herein, it is not clear what sort of 
proof will be required to avoid it. Little help is to be found in 
the opinions. In most of the cases no question of mistake was 
raised. In some of these it could be inferred that the mistake test 
could have been passed, had it been put, because the parties 
agreed without a survey or to avoid a survey, from which it could 
have been inferred that they did not agree merely on the assump-
tion that the true line had been found.67 More commonly, how-
ever, agreements have been upheld, without mention of mistake, 
where they were made following surveys of the land, a circum-
stance which, in the absence of other proof, suggests that the par-
ties agreed on the assumption that the survey had located the true 
66 See notes 14-16 supra. Cf. Olin v. Henderson, 120 Mich. 149, 79 N.W. 178 (1899). 
67 E.g., Peebles v. McDonald, 208 Ark. 834, 188 S.W. (2d) 289 (1945); Euse v. Gibbs, 
(Fla. 1951) 49 S. (2d) 843; Shiver v. Hill, 148 Ga. 616, 97 S.E. 676 (1918); Horn v. Thomp-
son, 389 III. 176, 58 N.E. (2d) 896 (1945); Reynolds v. Hood, 209 Mo. 611, 108 S.W. 86 
(1908). Cf. Hoar v. Hennessy, 29 Mont. 253, 74 P. 452 (1903), where there had been a 
survey, but a dispute followed whether the survey was correct, which was then followed 
by an agreement; Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch Co., 17 N.M. 246, 134 P. 228 (1912), 
where the agreement was written and expressly recognized an existing uncertainty. 
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line, which in turn should render such agreements vulnerable to 
the mistake rule.68 Indeed in nearly every state where the mistake 
rule has been adopted cases are to be found in which no mention 
of mistake was made, and many of these are cases which fall in 
the category last mentioned. 
Further questions remain unanswered. To what extent will 
the courts draw inferences from the two kinds of fact situations 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph? What other fact situations 
will form the basis for inferences as to the intention of the parties 
in regard to the mistake requirements? Will the parties be allowed 
to testify directly on the question of their precise intention at the 
time of the agreement? As to the last question, since the agree-
ment itself is oral and informal, no objection may be possible to 
the admissibility of this kind of testimony, although its reliabil-
ity will certainly diminish as the purpose of such a question be-
comes apparent. 
It must be concluded that the uncertainties about the nature 
of the mistake rule and the extent of any court's commitment to 
it, together with the other difficulties previously noted in deter-
mining what a boundary agreement is and when and why it will 
be given effect, reduce the predictability of decision on the effect 
of such agreements almost to zero. 
Cases· from two states specifically reject the mistake rule,69 
although in one of them 70 the facts were such as to have passed 
the test of mistake as defined above if it had been applied. 
II. ACQUIESCENCE 
There is a large body of authority to the effect that a boundary 
may be given a binding practical location by what the courts call 
the acquiescence of adjoining landowners. It is evident that the 
precise meaning of this kind of practical location is as elusive as 
practical location by parol agreement. In fact it may be noted 
68 E.g., Bennett v. Swafford, 146 Ga. 473, 91 S.E. 553 (1917); Bloomington v. Bloom-
ington Cemetery Assn., 126 Ill. 221, 18 N.E. 298 (1888); Kitchen v. Cbantland, 130 Iowa 
618, 105 N.W. 367 •(1906); Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607, 75 P. 1019 (1904); Carver 
v. Turner, 310 Ky. 99, 219 S.W. (2d) 409 (1949); Smith v. Hamilton, 20 -Mich. 433 (1870); 
Schwartzer v. Gebhardt, 157 Mo. 99, 57 S.W. 782 (1900); Box Elder Livestock Co. v. 
Glynn, 58 'Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); Hitchcock v. Libby, 70 N.H. 399, 47 A. 269 
(1900); Huffman v. Mills, 131 W.Va. 218, 46 S.E. (2d) 787 (1948). 
69 Lindsay v. Springer, 4 Harr. (Del. Super.) 547 (1848); Cooper v. Austin, 58 Tex. 
494 (1883). Cf. Beatty v. Taylor, 187 Iowa 723, 174 N.W. 484 (1919), where there was an 
agreement on a line, but the court applied its rule of acquiescence. 
70 Cooper v. Austin, 58 Tex. 494 (1883). 
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at the outset that practical location by acquiescence and by parol 
agreement are not neatly separable. One reason for this is ob-
vious: the acquiescence of the parties is often held to be a factor 
in the practical location of a boundary by parol agreement. 
Other reasons will appear. It is the position of a large number 
of courts that a boundary can be established by the acquiescence 
of the parties for the period of the statute of limitations appli-
cable to adverse possession cases.71 In others the stated effect of 
acquiescence is accepted, but the applicability of the period of 
the statute of limitations is left in doubt.72 Georgia has a statute 
which provides for the determination of a boundary by seven 
years' acquiescence.73 In other states similar effect has been given 
to "long acquiescence."74 In most of the latter the acquiescence 
exceeded the statutory period in fact. Judging by the experience 
of some of the courts in the first category, some of the latter 
courts may in time impose the statutory period. Others may de-
71 Brown v. Leete, (C.C. Nev. 1880) 2 F. 440; Arizona: Hein v. Nutt, 66 Ariz. 107, 
184 P. (2d) 656 (1947); Arkansas: Seidenstricker v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark. 644, 217 S.W. 
(2d) 836 (1949); California: Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864); Florida: Palm Orange 
Groves v. Yelvington, (Fla. 1949) 41 S. (2d) 883; Iowa: Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 
654, 82 N.W. 1038 (1900); Kentucky: Rice v. Shoemaker, (Ky. 1956) 286 S.W. (2d) 523; 
Maine: Faught v. Holway, 50 Me. 24 (1861); Michigan: Johnson v. Squires, 344 Mich. 
687, 75 N.W. (2d) 45 (1956); Minnesota: Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740 
(1893); Nebraska: Romine v. West, 134 Neb. 274, 278 N.W. 490 (1938); Nevada: Adams 
v. Child, 28 Nev. 169, 88 P. 1087 (1905); New York: Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359 
(1857); North Dakota: Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N.D. 549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931); Pennsylvania: 
Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 245 Pa. 94, 91 A. 211 (1914); Rhode Island: Malone v. 
O'Connell, (R.I. 1957) 133 A. (2d) 756; South Carolina: Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51, 
32 S.E. (2d) 882 (1945); South Dakota: Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518 (1918); 
Washington: Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257, 84 P. 822 (1906); West Virginia: Gwynn 
v. Schwartz, 32 W.Va. 487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889); Wyoming: Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 
491, 236 P. 517 (1925). Other cases may stand for the same proposition, but the question 
is left in some doubt: Illinois: Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N.E. (2d) 147 
(1955); Indiana: Curless v. State, 172 Ind. 257, 87 N.E. 129 (1909); Vermont: Brown v. 
Edson, 23 Vt. 435 (1851). Cf. Vermont Marble Co. v. Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 101 A. 151 
(1917). 
72 Colorado: Prieshof v. Baum, 94 Colo. 324, 29 P. (2d) 1032 (1934); Oklahoma: Lake 
v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950). 
73 Ga. Code Ann. (1955) §85-1602. Cf. Iowa Code Ann. (1950) §650.6, which has been 
construed to have a similar effect, Davis v. Curtis, 68 Iowa 66, 25 N.W. 932 (1885), but 
this section has been rarely relied on in recent years; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) §34-301. 
74 Missouri: Mothershead v. Milfeld, 361 'Mo. 704, 236 S.W. (2d) 343 (1951); Tennessee: 
Davis v. Jones, 40 Tenn. 603 (1859); Utah: Provonsha v. Pitman, (Utah 1957) 305 P. (2d) 
486; Wisconsin: Grell v. Ganser, 255 Wis. 381, 39 N.W. (2d) 397 (1949). See Mississippi: 
Hulbert v. Fayard, (Miss. 1957) 92 S. (2d) 247 at 251; New Hampshire: Berry v. Garland, 
26 N.H. 473, 482 (1853). Others may be to the same effect, although the question is in 
doubt. Kansas: Fyler v. Hartness, 171 Kan. 49, 229 P. (2d) 751 (1951); Montana: Borge-
son v. Tubb, 54 Mont. 557, 172 P. 326 (1918); New Mexico: Woodburn v. Grimes 58 
N.M. 717, 275 P. (2d) 850 (1954); Oregon: Ogilvie v. Stackland, 92 Ore. 352, 179 P. 669 
(1919). 
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liberately leave the period flexible. In Missouri, for example, the 
court said that the period must be long enough to show mutual 
acceptance of the boundary or that the parties were conscious of 
it.75 Some reference should be made to decisions determining 
boundaries on the basis of long general recognition thereof in 
urban areas as shown by lot lines on the ground, sidewalks, and 
streets. It has been so held in Massachusetts, which does not other-
wise recognize the doctrine of practical location by parol agree-
ment or acquiescence.76 But in none of these cases is any explana-
tion offered for the results reached. 
The Requirements and Theory of Acquiescence 
,The largest proportion of the courts which have accepted 
practical location in terms of acquiescence alone have nevertfie-
less explained their position on the basis that acquiescence is evi-
dence of an agreement between the parties, as conclusive evidence 
of such an agreement, or as a basis for inferring an agreement.77 
It may be that some courts regard long acquiescence in a line on 
the ground as raising a presumption that an express boundary 
agreement was made in the past.78 If this presumption is conclu-
sive, one is reminded of the lost-grant theory of prescription. The 
rule becomes one of policy, not of evidence. For the most part, 
however, the courts seem to be proceeding on the basis that ac-
quiescence, rathe:i;- than raising a presumption of an unproved 
agreement, is evidence of an agreement implied in fact from such 
acquiescence. In other words, a boundary agreement may be ex-
pressly made, or implied from conduct, acquiescence for the re-
quired period being a specifically designated category of the 
75 Tillman v. Hutcherson, 348 Mo. 473, 154 S.W. (2d) 104 (1941); Diers v. Peterson, 
290 Mo. 249, 234 S.W. 792 (1921). 
76 Hathaway v. Evans, 108 Mass. 267 (1871); Chenery v. Inhabitants of Waltham, 62 
Mass. 327 (1851); Kellogg v. Smith, 61 Mass. 375 (1851). See also Butler v. Vicksburg, 
(Miss. 1895) 17 S. 605; Crandall v. Mary, 67 Ore. 18, 135 P. 188 (1913). 
77 Brown v. Leete, (C.C. Nev. 1880) 2 F. 440; Seidenstricker v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark. 
644, 217 S.W. (2d) 836 (1949); Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864); Axmear v. Richards, 
112 Iowa 657, 84 N.W. 686 (1900); Fyler v. Hartness, 171 Kan. 49, 229 P. (2d) 751 (1951); 
Garvin v. Threlkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092 (1917); Mothershead v. Milfeld, 361 
Mo. 704, 236 S.W. (2d) 343 (1951); Malone v. O'Connell, (R.I. 1957) 133 A. (2d) 756; 
Hummel v. Young, 1 Utah (2d) 237, 265 P. (2d) 410 (1953); Gwynn v. Schwartz, 32 W.Va. 
487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889); Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925). 
78 Roberts v. Brae, 5 Cal. (2d) 356, 54 P. (2d) 698 (1936); Board of Public Instruction 
v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548, 189 S. 663 (1939); Mitchell Willis Coal Co. v. Liberty Coal Co., 
220 Ky. 661, 295 S.W. 987 (1927); Stumpe v. Kopp, 201 Mo. 412, 99 S.W. 1073 (1907); 
Dragos v. Russell, 120 Utah 626, 237 P. (2d) 831 (1951). 
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latter. Under this view, when a court says that acquiescence is 
conclusive evidence of an agreement, presumably all that is meant 
is that the required proof of acquiescence is alone sufficient proof 
of an agreement. 
Not all courts, however, have been consistent in this regard. 
The Arkansas court, after previously determining a boundary on 
the basis of acquiescence alone for the statutory period, 79 held 
that evidence of acquiescence in a fence for fifty years was not 
enough without other evidence of an agreement between the ad-
joining owners.80 Similarly, the Utah court, after some vacilla-
tion, 81 expressly left open the question whether proof that no 
express agreement in fact was ever entered would prevent a 
boundary from being determined by acquiescence.82 The Cali-
fornia court held on one occasion that acquiescence in a fence was 
not sufficient in the absence of other evidence of an agreement, 83 
although in a later case the court held to the contrary.84 Such 
views as these are directly contrary to any proposition that ac-
quiescence is alone sufficient proof of an agreement. If the courts 
were thinking of acquiescence as raising a presumption of an ex-
press agreement, it is clear that they do not regard the presump-
tion as conclusive. It is possible that these courts were thinking of 
acquiescence solely as a post-agreement requirement, in which 
case it could not serve this function unless an agreement had by 
other means first been made. At any rate the views mentioned in 
this paragraph have not received general acceptance. 
It is easy to foresee the prospect of confusion where boundary 
agreements must be supported by acquiescence and where ac-
quiescence also is given separate significance, but only in terms of 
implying an agreement. It is necessary to inquire what the courts 
mean by acquiescence. 
The term connotes passivity. But it also implies the existence 
of something in which to acquiesce. In the present context the 
primary condition of acquiescence is the physical designation in 
some manner of a line on the ground. Must acquiescence in that 
79 Seidenstricker v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark. 644, 217 S.W. (2d) 836 (1949). 
so Brown Paper Mill Co. y. Warnix, 222 Ark. 417, 259 S.W. (2d) 495 (1953). It should 
be added that there was some evidence here that the fence was not intended to mark 
the boundary. 
81 Hummel v. Young, I Utab (2d) 237, 265 P. (2d) 410 (1953). 
82 Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Utah (2d) 119, 269 P. (2d) 1053 (1954). 
83 Dauberman v. Grant, 198 Cal. 586, 246 P. 319 (1926). Cf. Thomas v. Harlan, 27 
Wash. (2d) 512, 178 P. (2d) 965 (1947). 
84 Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal. (2d) 849, 147 P. (2d) 572 (1944). 
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line mean something more than conduct consistent with its con-
tinued existence? It obviously must mean conduct which signifies 
assent to that line as a boundary. What sort of conduct supplies 
evidence of such assent? It is easy to think of words and acts, 
short of an express boundary agreement, which would serve such 
a purpose. Must some such affirmative conduct always be present? 
Under what circumstances will mere inaction or silence be sig-
nificant? The word "recognition" is frequently used instead of or 
together with "acquiescence." This word connotes an active in-
gredient. But recognition may be only momentary, while ac-
quiescence connotes the continuity of circumstances that is re-
quired. One of the requirements insisted upon by the courts is 
that acquiescence be mutual.85 T4is too suggests conduct that is 
not wholly passive. An active-passive essence is indicated by one 
court's statement that "to acquiesce means to rest satisfied with-
out opposition, to submit without opposition or question, to yield 
assent .... It must be done by acts or declarations on the part of 
those who are claimed to have acquiesced .... "86 Another court 
explained in this way, "It must be kept in mind that the ac-
quiescence required is not merely passive consent to the existence 
of a fence, ... but rather is conduct or lack thereof from which 
assent to the fence ... as a boundary line may be reasonably in-
ferred."87 May we conclude tentatively that acquiescence means 
mutual recognition over a period of time of a line on the ground 
as a boundary? If so, the notion that acquiescence also raises a 
presumption of an agreement made in the past is unnecessary 
and misleading. If it is to be explained, on the other hand, as a 
way of manifesting the necessary assent, or as constituting an 
agreement implied from conduct, we are still left to inquire what 
sort of conduct is sufficient for this purpose, to what extent pas-
sivity must be supported by activity, and whether acquiescence 
means the same thing in all cases. 
Where there has been an express boundary agreement, any 
supporting acquiescence may be wholly passive. It would be as-
sumed that the parties have acquiesced unless by later words or 
acts they manifest a change of mind. So it would be where ac-
85 De Viney v. Hughes, 243 Iowa 1388, 55 N.W. (2d) 478 (1952); Hakanson v. Manders, 
158 Neb. 392, 63 N.W. (2d) 436 (1954); Ward v. Rodriguez, 43 N:M. 191, 88 P. (2d) 277 
(1939); Nelson v. Da Rouch, 87 Utah 457, 50 P. (2d) 273 (1935); State v. Vanderkoppel, 
45 Wyo. 432, 19 P. (2d) 955 (1933). 
86 Thompson v. Simmons, 143 Ga. 95, 84 S.E. 370 (1914). 
87 Engquist v. Wirtjes, 243 Minn. 502 at 507, 63 N.W. (2d) 412 (1955). 
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quiescence is merely a post-agreement requirement. Where there 
is an initial agreement, a court may still speak solely in terms of 
acquiescence, treating the agreement not as having independent 
significance, but merely as supplying the active ingredient of ac-
quiescence. 88 The same analysis may be made where the initial 
manifestation of assent to a line as a boundary is not an express 
agreement but one implied from the parties' conduct.89 
There are many cases, however, in which there were no ex-
press boundary agreements nor facts which would justify the in-
ference that at any particular point of time an agreement had 
been manifested by the conduct of the parties. There are cases, 
for example, in which the conduct of the parties is equivocal, 
such as the erection or maintenance of a fence or possession to a 
fence or other line established some time in the past. In such a 
case the time element may assume controlling importance and 
serve to characterize their equivocal conduct. Such conduct is at 
least consistent with an intention to accept the line as a boundary 
or a belief that it marked the true line, and where the required 
period of time has passed without any manifestation of a con-
trary purpose, it may be permissible to infer that their assent has 
been given.90 Or even more clearly, subsequent words or acts may 
give color to their equivocal conduct. It would still be appropriate 
to speak in terms of an implied agreement, but this would be an 
agreement in a special sense, meaningful only in relation to the 
special requirements of acquiescence. Here again, both the active 
and passive ingredients of acquiescence are present, but with the 
passive element assuming a rather special significance. We should 
realize that in such a case the parties are always allowed to prove 
if they can that a fence or hedge was erected only for convenience 
or as a barrier,91 or subject to the future determination of the 
88 McGill v. •Dowman, 195 Ga. 357, 24 S:E. (2d) 195 (1943); Lannigan v. Andre, 241 
Iowa 1027, 44 N.W. (2d) 354 (1950); Beatty v. Taylor, 187 Iowa 723, 174 N.W. 484 (1919); 
Miskotten v. Drenten, 318 Mich. 538, 29 N.W. (2d) 91 (1947); Di Santo v. De Bellis, 55 
R.I. 433, 182 A. 488 (1935); Harman v. Alt, 69 W.Va. 287, 71 S.E. 709 (1911). Cf. Clark 
v. Tabor, 28 Vt. 222 (1856); Wollman v. Ruehle, 100 Wis. 31, 75 N.W. 425 (1898). 
89 Rogers v. -Moore, 207 Ga. 182, 60 S.E. (2d) 359 (1950); Helberg v. Kepler, 178 
Iowa 354, 159 N.W. 972 (1916); Griffin v. Brown, 167 Iowa 599, 149 N.W. 833 (1914); 
Gregory v. Thorrez, 277 Mich. 197, 269 N.W. 142 (1936); Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 
239 P. (2d) 205 (1951). 
90 See especially Dake v. Ward, 168 Iowa 118, 150 N.W. 50 (1914). 
91 Grants Pass Land and Water Co. v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914); Shaw 
v. Williams, (Fla. 1951) 50 S. (2d) 125; O'Dell v. Hanson, 241 Iowa 657, 42 N.W. (2d) 
86 (1950); Jones v. Smith, 64 N.Y. 180 (1876); Ungaro v. Mete, 68 R.I. 419, 27 A. (2d) 
826 (1942); Harrison v. Lanoway, 214 S.C. 294, 52 S.E. (2d) 264 (1949); Ringwood v. 
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boundary.92 Where there is proof merely of the long existence of 
a fence, some courts have indicated that no presumptions are 
available and that a claim of acquiescence will fail without other 
proof.93 But in other cases, where there is evidence of possession 
or other acts in conformity to the alleged line, the impression is 
left that the courts have tacitly assumed that long-existing fences 
were intended or believed to mark boundaries, 94 if in fact a court 
has not raised an inference or presumption to that effect.95 The in-
ference of an acceptance of a fence as a boundary may be stronger 
where the fence was erected following a slirvey.06 It is not indi-
cated whether the purpose of equivocal conduct can be supplied 
solely by the testimony of the parties, but no basis for the ex-
clusion of such testimony is evident other than its questionable 
reliability.97 The question of proof of acquiescence will in tlie 
first instance normally be submitted to a jury. This explains why 
in so many cases the facts of acquiescence are not fully reported. 
The instructions to a jury also are seldom reported, but it may 
be doubted that juries are always adequately instructed. Whether 
instructions are put merely in general terms, or with some expla-
nation of the meaning of acquiescence, it is probable that juries 
have based their findings of acquiescence both on proof of ex-
press and implied agreements with passive acquiescence therein 
and on inferences from equivocal acts or silence or appraisals of 
conflicting testimony. 
Bradford, 2 Utah (2d) 119, 269 P. (2d) 1053 (1954); Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wash. (2d) 
512, 178 P. (2d) 965 (1947); Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 179 P. (2d) 1012 (1947). 
92 Brown v. Brown, 18 Idaho 345, 110 P. 269 (1910). 
93 Hill v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 362, 187 P. 437 (1919); :Benjamin v. O'Rourke, 
197 Iowa 1338, 199 N.W. 488 (1924); Ennis v. Stanley, 346 Mich. 296, 78 N.W. (2d) 114 
(1956); Reel v. Walter, (Mont. 1957) 309 P. (2d) 1027; Ward v. Rodriguez, 43 N.M. 191, 
88 P. (2d) 277 (1939); Harrison v. Lanoway, 214 S.C. 294, 52 S.E. (2d) 264 (1949). 
94 Seidenstricker v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark. 644, 217 S.W. (2d) 836 (1949); Dye v. 
Dotson, 201 Ga. 1, 39 S.E. (2d) 8 (1946); Mitchell Willis Coal Co. v. Liberty Coal Co., 
220 Ky. 661, 295 S.W. 987 (1927); F.H. Wolf Brick Co. v. Lonyo, 132 Mich. 162, 93 N.W. 
251 (1903); McCoy v. Hance, 28 Pa. 149 (1857). See Missouri cases cited note 140 infra. 
Of particular interest are the cases in Iowa, where the court has had more occasion than 
in any other state to consider the requirements of acquiescence. Concannon v. Blackman, 
232 Iowa 722, 6 N.W. (2d) 116 (1942); Brown v. •Bergman, 204 Iowa 1006, 216 N.W. 731 
(1927); Chandler v. Hopson, 188 Iowa 281, 175 N.W. 62 (1919); Tice v. Shangle, 182 
Iowa 601, 164 N.W. 246 (1917). 
95 Dake v. Ward, 168 Iowa 118, 150 N.W. 50 (1914); Woodburn v. Grimes, 58 N.M. 
717, 275 P. (2d) 850 (1954); Lewis v. Smith, 187 Okla. 404, 103 P. (2d) 512 (1940); Provonsha 
v. Pitman, (Utah 1957) 305 P. (2d) 486; Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257, 84 P. 822 
(1906). 
96 Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864). 
97 Cf. Dake v. Ward, 168 Iowa 118, 150 N.W. 50 (1914). 
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From the confusing blend of agreement and acquiescence con-
cepts of practical location we must conclude that the results in 
some cases can be explained either in terms of an agreement with 
subsequent acquiescence or of acquiescence alone but that there 
are other cases which can be adequately explained only in terms 
of acquiescence in a somewhat different sense. To speak of the 
latter cases also as constituting agreements is to use that term in 
a looser sense even than is found in cases where boundaries are 
established by agreement without acquiescence. All this means 
that the term "acquiescence" may be used with at least three vary-
ing meanings. In one case it may be wholly passive, referring to 
a post-agreement requirement. In another: case with the same facts 
it may refer both to the initial "agreement," express or implied, 
and to the passive conduct which follows. In a third case it may 
also refer to both active and passive conduct, but which are 
blended and often concurrent and perhaps inseparable. 
, Not all courts, however, have chosen to explain their rule of 
acquiescence in terms of boundary agreements. A different theory 
was first announced by the New York court in Baldwin v. 
Brown. 98 The requisite acquiescence is evidence of the true line 
so conclusive that the parties are precluded from offering evidence 
to the contrary. The rule is identified as a "rule of repose," which 
is supported by the same reason as supports the doctrine of ad-
verse possession. Other courts' have adopted the same rationale 
for their decisions.99 There are two thoughts here. The latter is 
prescriptive. But calling acquiescence conclusive evidence of tbe 
true line is something else. Prescription carries no respect for the 
true line. And it is not easy to see how proof of acquiescence is 
necessarily proof of the location of the true line. This theory may 
rather reflect a realization of the basic problem of practical loca-
tion: the bridging of the gap between a description and a bound-
ary on the ground, and a revulsion against the notion of a bound-
ary which shifts with every new survey. If a boundary is to be locat-
9816 N.Y. 359 (1857). 
99 Biggins v. Champlin, 59 Cal. 113 (1881); Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 654, 82 
N.W. 1038 (1900); Hotze v. Ring, 273 Ky. 48, 115 S.W. (2d) 311 (1938); Bartlett v. Brown, 
121 ,Mo. 353, 25 S.W. 1108 (1894); O'Donnell v. Penney, 17 R.I. 164, 20 A. 305 (1890);. 
Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51, 32 S.E. (2d) 882 (1944); Hummel v. Young, 1 Utah (2d) 
237, 265 P. (2d) 410 (1953). Chew v. Morton, IO Watts (50 Pa.) 321 (1840), expresses the 
same policy without the use of -the evidentiary terminology. Rosen v. Ihler, 267 Wis. 
220, 64 N.W. (2d) 845 (1954), declares that long acquiescence raises a presumption of the 
true line which cannot be overcome by recent surveys. Cf. Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601 
(1878). 
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ed short of litigation, a point must be recognized where the loca-
tion becomes binding. After the requisite period of acquiescence 
the line acquiesced in becomes conclusive in the sense that it has 
been given an adequate location on the ground, not because there 
is no other place where a surveyor, applying the documents of 
title, might locate it. The same thought may lie behind the state-
ment that a line long acquiesced in, especially if it is marked oy 
a fence, is better evidence of the "true line" than later surveys 
after the original monuments have disappeared.100 It is better evi-
dence only because the court says it is, and the court says it is 
because it is at least an acceptable basis for .getting the question 
settled once and for all. Such a rationale is not essentially differ-
ent from the explanation of acquiescence in terms of an agree-
ment. 
The thought of acquiescence as prescriptive, nevertheless, is 
pervasive. This in turn leaves doubt about its relation to the doc-
trine of adverse possession. It is startling how often courts, al-
though speaking in terms of acquiescence, have not made it clear 
which doctrine they were applying or even whether they recog-
nize any difference between them.101 In other cases, some of which 
have come from the same courts that on other occasions have 
confused the doctrines, the separate existence or varying require-
ments of the two doctrines have been expressly declared.102 Nu-
merous other cases could be cited which are to the same effect 
because of the separate application or consideration in each of 
them of both doctrines. There are clear indications in several 
states of the acceptance of a more liberal acquiescence rule as an 
escape from the controversial proposition that possession to a 
100 See Rosen v. Ihler, 267 Wis. 220 at 226, 64 N.W. (2d) 845 (1954). See also "The 
Cooley Dictum," p. 526 infra. 
101 Shaw v. Williams, (Fla. 1951) 50 S. (2d) 125; Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 
N.W. (2d) 147 (1955); Palmer v. Dosch, 148 Ind. 10, 47 N;E. 176 (1897); Klinkner v. 
Schmidt, 114 Iowa 695, 87 N.W. 661 (1901); Rice v. Shoemaker, (Ky. 1956) 286 S.W. (2d) 
523; Vogel v. Gruenhagen, 238 Minn. 247, 56 N.W. (2d) 427 (1953); Bernier v. Preckel, 
60 N.D. 549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931); Vermont Marble Co. v. Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 101 A. 
151 (1917); Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257, 84 P. 822 (1906). Cf. Marek v. Jelinek, 121 
Minn. 468, 141 N.W. 788 (1913). 
102,Dierssen v. Nelson, 138 Cal. 394, 71 P. 456 (1903); Tietjen v. Dobson, 170 Ga. 
123, 152 S.E. 222 (1930); Schlender v. Maretoli, 140 Kan. 533, 37 P. (2d) 933 (1934); Stacy 
v. Alexander, 143 Ky. 152, 136 S.W. 150 (1911); Faught v. Holway, 50 Me. 24 (1861); 
Warner v. Noble, 286 Mich. 654, 282 N.W. 855 (1938); Lewis v. Smith, 187 Okla. 404, 
103 P. (2d) 512 (1940); Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 245 Pa. 94, 91 A. 211 (1914); 
Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51, 32 S.E. (2d) 882 (1944); Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 
491, 236 P. 517 (1925). Cf. Lamm v. Hardigree, 188 Okla. 378, 109 P. (2d) 225 (1941), 
where the two rules were confused. 
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boundary line in the mistaken belief that such line is the true 
line may prevent such possession from being adverse;103 or as an 
escape from an unduly restrictive privity requirement.104 
It has been said that mutuality of acquiescence is required. 
But this does not mean that the parties must be equally active in 
its manifestation. Sometimes the claim of one owner to a line on 
the ground or his assent to it as a boundary will be obvious, and 
the problem will center on the role of his neighbor. Courts have 
insisted that mutuality requires certain knowledge by the latter of 
the farmer's conduct. A case cannot be made against him if he did 
not know of the existence of a line or the occupation of his neigh-
bor according to it, 105 or even if he did not know of his neigh-
bor's claim or purpose.106 It has been indicated that the circum-
stances may be such as to impute knowledge to him.107 The im-
plication is clear that where knowledge is present, acquiescence 
by one of the parties may consist only of his silence for the re-
quired period.108 The latter conclusion may be acceptable if it 
means that the inactivity of one party with knowledge of his 
neighbor's activity raises an inference or a presumption of assent 
to or recognition of the line established by his neighbor. But if 
it is carried to the extent of precluding any rebuttal of such a pre-
103 Handorf v. Hoes, 121 Iowa 79, 95 N.W. 226 (1903); Warner v. Noble, 286 Mich. 
654, 282 N.W. 855 (1938); Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51, 32 S.E. (2d) 882 (1944); Carstensen 
v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925). 
104 Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N.W. 169 (1926). A remarkable use of 
the acquiescence doctrine has been made in California. There payment of taxes is required 
on land adversely possessed. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1953) §325. A problem arises 
in boundary cases in proving that a particular tract on which taxes have been paid in-
cluded all land embraced within the alleged boundary, since tbe definition of the land 
assessed is of course in terms of written descriptions. The acquiescence doctrine is used 
to modify a description according to a boundary established by acquiescence, but of 
course without changing ,the written description in fact. Taxes are therefore to be re-
garded as paid on all land lying within the boundaries so established, and title to such 
land can ripen by adverse possession. Dierssen v. Nelson, 138 Cal. 394, 71 P. 456 (1903); 
Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 119 P. 893 (1911). See also Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 
359, 262 P. (2d) 1006 (1953). This does not mean that acquiescence can serve only this 
limited purpose in California, for there are many cases, including those just cited, which 
recognized acquiescence as a separate ground for tlie determination of boundaries. 
105 Maes v. Olmstead, 247 Mich. 180, 225 N.W. 583 (1929); Hakanson v. Manders, 
158 Neb. 392, 63 N.W. (2d) 436 (1954); Ward v. Rodriguez, 43 N:M. 191, 88 P. (2d) 277 
(1939); Silsby and Co. v. Kinsley, 89 Vt. 263, 95 A. 634 (1915). 
106 Connell v. Clifford, 39 Colo. 121, 88 P. 850 (1907); De Viney v. Hughes, 243 
Iowa 1!188, 55 N.W. (2d) 478 (1952); Nelson v. DaRouch, 87 Utah 457, 50 P. (2d) 273 
(1935); State v. Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 19 P. (2d) 955 (1933). 
107 Silsby and Co. v. Kinsley, 89 Vt. 263, 95 A. 634 (1915). Cf. Atkins v. Reagan, 244 
Iowa 1387, 60 N.W. (2d) 790 (1953). 
108 Hakanson v. Manders, 158 Neb. 392, 63 N.W. (2d) 436 (1954), where the court so 
stated; Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, IO N.W. 6 (1881). 
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sumption, the result can hardly be accepted in vindication 0£ a 
requirement 0£ mutuality of acquiescence. To the extent that 
mutuality is insisted upon, any prescriptive theory of acquiescence 
is inappropriate. At least there is normally no requirement of 
knowledge by one party of the adverse possession of the other. 
Noting further the contrast between acquiescence and adverse 
possession, although possession by one or both parties is frequent-
ly present, and may be regarded as evidence of acquiescence,1011 
it has been held not to be req-qired of either party, 110 or if present 
it need not be continuous. But since a boundary by acquiescence 
may be regarded as one kind of practical location on the ground, 
it is essential that its precise location be apparent.111 If this is not 
shown by the possessory acts of the parties, the line must somehow 
be marked by monuments.112 This does not require artificial 
monuments, however, and a road,113 river,114 trees and shrub-
bery, 115 an encroaching building, 116 or even a ditch, 117 may suf-
fice. 118 There are indications that some courts will allow possession 
by the parties to serve this purpose in the absence of monuments, 
even though possession is not otherwise necessary.119 Alleged 
boundaries have been marked by fences or the like in the great 
majority of cases, but some liberality has been shown in regard to 
the manner of marking, and lines have been approved which 
were marked by a single monument120 or by monuments at their 
termini.121 
109 Tietjen v. Dobson, 170 Ga. 123, 152 S.E. 222 (1929). 
110 Watt v. Ganahl, 34 Ga. 290 (1866); Stacy v. Alexander, 143 Ky. 152, 136 S.W. 
150 (1911); Brown v. Edson, 23 Vt. 435 (1851); Gwynn v. Schwartz, 32 W.Va. 487, 9 S.E. 
880 (1889). 
111 Scott v. Slater, 42 Wash. (2d) 366, 255 P. (2d) 377 (1953). 
112Trimpl v. Meyer, 246 Iowa 1245, 71 N.W. (2d) 437 (1955); Beckman v. Metzger, 
(Okla. 1956) 299 P. (2d) 152; Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 245 Pa. 94, 91 A. 211 (1914). 
113 Quade v. Pillard, 135 Iowa 359, 112 N.W. 646 (1907). 
114 Griffith v. Murray, 166 Iowa 380, 147 N.W. 855 (1914). 
115-Renwick v. Noggle, 247 Mich. 150, 225 N.W. 535 (1929). 
116Atkins v. Reagan, 244 Iowa 1387, 60 N.W. (2d) 790 (1953). 
117Vander Zyl v. Muilenberg, 239 Iowa 73, 29 N.W. (2d) 412 (1948). 
118 Tarver v. Naman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) 265 S.W. (2d) 852, permitted an unmarked 
projection of a fence. Contra: Lane v. Jacobs, 166 App. iDiv. 182, 152 N.Y.S. 605 (1915); 
Grants Pass Land and Water Co. v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914). 
119 Muchenberger v. Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 635, 275 P. 803 (1929); Gildea v. Warren, 
~73 Mich. 28, 138 N.W. 232 (1912). Cf. Beckman v. Metzger, (Okla. 1956) 299 P. (2d) 152. 
120 Havlik v. Freeman, 214. Ark. 761, 218 S.W. (2d) 364 (1949); Carr v. Schomberg, 
104 Cal. App. (2d) 850, 232 P. (2d) 597 (1951); Breakey v. Woolsey, 149 Mich. 86, 112 
N.W. 719 (1907). 
· 121Frericks v. Sorensen, 113 Cal. App. (2d) 759, 248 P. {2d) 949 ·(1952); Needham v •. 
~ollamer, 94 Cal. App. {2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949). Cf. Truett v. Adams, 66 Cal. 218, 
5 P. 96 (1884), in which it does not appear what or where the landmarks were. 
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If acquiescence is regarded as evidence from which an agree-
ment may be inferred, it must be decided whether the special 
requirements for boundary agreements, such as uncertainty about 
the true boundary and absence of mistake, are applicable. The 
force of the mistake rule in the acquiescence cases is separately 
considered below. In regard to uncertainty, the most notable 
fact is that this requirement is seldom mentioned. Obviously, 
many courts which presume or infer an agreement also presume 
the uncertainty upon which an agreement must be founded.122 
This presumption is a necessary corollary of a fictional presump-
tion of an initial agreement, but not of acquiescence as itself 
constituting an agreement implied from conduct. In any event, 
in many cases the circumstances existing when the acquiescence 
began are unknO"wn, and no point is made of this fact. It has 
been held in fact that neither a dispute nor uncertainty is re-
quired in acquiescence cases.123 In several cases, however, courts 
have held that uncertainty cannot be inferred where there is 
proof to the contrary, 124 or seemed to say that lack of proof of 
uncertainty is fatal to the proof of acquiescence.125 Similarly, 
the courts are divided on the effect of knowledge by the parties 
that the line acquiesced in was not the true line.126 The courts 
holding that such knowledge precludes a line by acquiescence 
are undoubtedly concerned about the same policy which gave 
rise to the requirement of uncertainty in the boundary-agree-
ment cases; that is, that the parties cannot transfer title to land 
informally. Holdings to the contrary, as well as holdings that 
there is no requirement of uncertainty, probably further reflect 
122 The California court expressly so stated. Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal. (2d) 849, 147 
P. (2d) 572 (1944); Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102, 201 P. 952 (1921). 
123 Tritt v. Hoover, 116 Mich. 4, 74 N.W. 177 (1898); Sherman v. Kane, 86 N.Y. 
57 (1881); Lewis v. Smith, 187 Okla. 404, 103 P. (2d) 512 (1940). 
124 Clapp v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 741, 130 P. 1061 (1913). Cf. Silva v. Azevedo, 178 
Cal. 495, 173 P. 929 (1918), where the court distinguished Clapp v. Churchill. 
125 Warwick v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, 206 Ga. 680, 58 S.E. (2d) 383 (1950), which 
is especially surprising since the acquiescence rule in that state is based on a statute 
[Ga. Code Ann. (1955) §85-1602]; Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 
141 P. (2d) 160 (1943), where there was also some question about whether the parties 
recognized the alleged line as the true line; Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 
517 (1925). 
126 Holding that this precludes a line by acquiescence: Nathan v. Dierssen, 134 Cal. 
282, 66 P. 485 (1901); McRae Land & Timber Co. v. Zeigler, (Fla. 1953) 65 S. (2d) 876; 
Tripp v. Bagley, 7~ Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928). Cf. Lind v. Hustad, 147 Wis. 56, 132 
N.W. 753 (1911). Holding that such knowledge makes no difference: McAvoy v. Saunders, 
161 Iowa 651, 143 N.W. 548 (1913); Di Santo v. De Bellis, 55 R.I. 433, 182 A. 488 (1935). 
Cf. Adams v. Child, 28 Nev. 169, 88 P. 1087 (1905); 'McCoy v. Hance, 28 Pa. 149 (1857). 
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the influence of prescriptive notions, under which the location 
of any true line is immaterial. 
We should not be surprised to find that some courts have 
characterized the practical location of boundaries by acquiescence 
by simple and casual references to estoppel.127 All of these courts 
have on other occasions offered one or the other or both of the 
rationales mentioned above. It is obvious that estoppel is used 
here in its loosest sense and probably again signifies the failure 
to discover or articulate the real interests or policy to be served. 
The same inference is suggested by the random use by a single 
court of more than one of the three alternative theories. These 
references to estoppel do not mean that the typical require-
ments of that doctrine will be imposed nor that the results are 
merely equitable. It is assumed that the legal title is affected, 
but only one of these courts has expressly declared this to be 
so.12s 
Here finally are several miscellaneous requirements which 
have been imposed in one or more cases. It has been held that 
the doctrine is not available against the state or its instru-
mentalities, 129 although in another case in the same state a city 
was held bound by acquiescence;130 that one cannot acquiesce 
who is non compos mentis;131 that a land contract purchaser 
in possession is competent to acquiesce so as to bind the succes-
sors to the legal title;182 and obviously that there can be no 
practical location of a boundary where the lands of the parties are 
not contiguous.188 
No attempt will be made here to recite the limitless variety 
of evidence, mostly circumstantial, which has been found rele-
vant in proving recognition of or acquiescence in a line as a 
boundary. As previously noted, in many cases the reports do not 
reveal all of the facts which produced a judgment in the court 
below. 
127a3rown v. Leete, (C.C.Nev. 1880) 2 F. 440; Columbet v. Pacheco, 48 Cal. 395 (1874); 
Henderson v. Dennis, 177 Ill. 547, 53 N.'E. 65 (1898); Curless v. State, 172 Ind. 257, 87 
N.E. 129 (1909); Turner v. Baker, 64 ,Mo. 218 (1876); Hakanson v. 'Manders, 158 Neb. 
392, 63 N.W. (2d) 436 (1954); Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518 (1918); Eubanks 
v. Buckley, 16 Wash. (2d) 24, 132 P. (2d) 353 (1942). 
128 Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218 (1876), where the court said that this was a special 
sort of estoppel confined to cases of this kind. 
129 Herrick v. Moore, 185 Iowa 828, 169 N.W. 741 (1918). 
180 Corey v. Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa 742, 92 N.W. 704 (1902). 
181 Santee v. Uhlenhopp, 184 Iowa 1131, 169 N.W. 321 (1918). 
182 Sheldon v. Perkins, 37 Vt. 550 (1865). 
133Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 27 P. 931 (1891). 
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Obviously the courts need to think out more carefully what 
they mean to make of acquiescence. Especially they need to de-
cide whether it is to be worked into the pattern of practical loca-
tion or whether it is some sort of prescription. The specific re-
quirements of acquiescence are not all consistent with either 
view. Obviously a court cannot decide what acquiescence is be-
fore deciding what it is for. Nor can the courts work with ac-
quiescence as a kind of practical location without forming a clear-
er idea of what practical location is all about. This may require 
the discarding of some prevailing concepts, analogies, and ter-
minology. 
A striking example of the helplessness of a court in the face 
of its own and other diverse precedents and dicta is to be found 
in the latest Illinois case.134 The court there does not make clear 
the relation of acquiescence either to parol agreements or to 
adverse possession. Where one in that state relies on acquiescence 
for less than the statutory period, he may have to meet the re-
quirements for express boundary agreements, including proof 
of uncertainty and absence of mistake. Where acquiescence ex-
ceeds the statutory period, it is not clear whether this has any 
significance except as proof of adverse possession. 
Effect of Mistake 
The problem of mistake is seldom raised where acquiescence 
alone is relied on. It can enter these cases, however, through a 
court's attempt to adapt them to the parol agreement doctrine; 
and it can also enter from another quarter where a court has 
not yet defined an acquiescence doctrine separable from adverse 
possession. Where a court is thinking in an adverse possession 
context, the question may be put in terms of whether the parties, 
during their acquiescence, were claiming only to the true line 
as defined in their deeds, wherever that might be. But in either 
case the meaning of mistake must be essentially the same; that 
is, the question is over the effect of an allegation and proof that 
the parties' acquiescence in a line was founded on a mistaken 
belief that the line was the true line. Objection may be taken 
to this statement of the question because it fails to take account 
of the subtle distinction which has appeared in the application 
of the mistake rule in the parol agreement cases. But such a dis-
134 Ginther v. Duginger, 6 m. (2d) 474, 129 N.E. (2d) 147 (1955). 
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tinction may seem unrealistic and especially difficult to apply 
where the ground for determining a boundary is in terms of 
acquiescence alone. The only way the distinction could be mean-
ingfully drawn would be in some such terms as these: Did the 
parties acquiesce in a line solely because of their belief, based on 
such facts as were available regarding their boundary, that such 
line was the true line, or were they in dispute or in doubt about 
the true line at the beginning of their acquiescence and perhaps 
throughout its continuance? At any rate there is no sign that 
such a distinction has been recognized in the few cases in which 
the question of mistake was raised. In several cases the courts 
have simply stated that mistake is immaterial.135 Several other 
courts, however, have indicated without· explanation that the ef-
fect of acquiescence is vitiated by mistake.136 The position of the 
Texas court to this effect is surprising in view of the fact that 
it is one of the few courts which have expressly rejected the mis-
take rule in cases of express boundary agreements.137 The Missouri 
court has held that there can be no inference of an agreement 
from an occupation to a line on the supposition that it was the 
true line,138 the presumption being that the party in possession 
intended to claim only to the true line;139 but if acquiescence in 
the line continues for the statutory period, the presumption is 
reversed and the parties will ·be bound.140 The position of the 
135 Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864); Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187 Cal. 
15, 200 P. 651 (1921); 'Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 654, 82 N.W. 1038 (1900); Leeka 
v. Chambers, 232 Iowa 1043, 6 N.W. (2d) 837 (1942); Chew v. Morton, 10 Watts (50 Pa.) 
321 (1840); Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925). In Anderson v. Buchanan, 
139 Iowa 676, 116 N.W. 694 (1908), and Bradley v. Burkhart, 139 Iowa 323, 115 N.W. 
597 (1908), the Iowa court also stated that it did not matter that the parties claimed no 
more than the land given them by their deeds. 
136 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 137 Tex. 59, 152 S.W. (2d) 711 (1941); White 
v. Ward, 35 W.Va. 418, 14 S.E. 22 (1891). Cf. Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P. (2d) 
257 (1949); Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N.E. (2d) 147 (1955), where it is 
not clear that :the court was considering acquiescence separately from a parol agreement; 
Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518 (1918), where the court said that mistake would 
defeat an express agreement, but that if the parties discovered the mistake and thereafter 
continued to acquiesce for the statutory period in the line agreed on, they would be 
bound, with some doubt left whether this was founded on the acquiescence doctrine 
or on adverse possession. In White v. Ward, supra, acquiescence was pleaded as a basis 
for estoppel, and the court responded that estoppel could not be .founded on a bona fide 
mistake. 
137 Cooper v. Austin, 58 Tex. 494 (1883), cited note 69 supra. 
138Schad v. Sharp, 95 'Mo. 573, 8 S.W. 549 (1888); Jacobs v. Moseley, 91 Mo. 457, 
4 s.w. 135 (1886). 
139 Three Way Land Co. v. Wells, (Mo. 1945) 185 S.W. (2d) 795; Tillman v. Hutcher-
son, 348 Mo. 473, 154 S.W. (2d) 104 (1941). 
140 Mothershead v. Milfeld, 361 Mo. 704, 236 S.W. (2d) 343 (1951); Tillman v. Hutcher-
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Missouri court is in contrast to those which have used the doctrine 
of acquiescence as an escape from the mistake requirements of 
adverse possession.141 
If a court accepts the mistake rule when talking about bound-
ary agreements, but not when talking about acquiescence, and 
so long as we cannot know how a court will choose between these 
overlapping concepts, further doubts are raised about whether 
a decision can be predicted in any case. 
III. EsTOPPEL 
In approaching the cases in which courts have resolved the 
problem of practical location in terms of estoppel, one may won-
der whether there is any benefit to be gained by an inquiry into 
the meaning and requirements of estoppel in other contexts. It 
is only natural to assume that such an inquiry would aid in the 
analysis of estoppel in the present context by providing a stand-
ard for judgment or at least a basis for comparison. But in look-
ing at estoppel generally one may come to doubt whether any 
standard is to be found. Attempts have been made to define or 
to state the requirements for one major area of the doctrine, 
estoppel in pais, of equitable origin.142 There must be a repre-
sentation of fact, by one who knows the true facts, to one who 
does not know, and a substantial change of position by the latter 
in reliance thereon. But to what extent have these requirements 
in application been redefined, distorted, or ignored? And what 
is to be said about estoppel by deed, estoppel of a tenant to deny 
his landlord's title, or of a bailee to deny his bailor's title, to 
mention but several of the miscellany to be found under the gen-
eral head? There can be no further pursuit here of a common 
thread, other than to state the impression that estoppel will be 
invoked in diverse situations where a court finds it inequitable 
or contrary to some policy to allow one who has taken a position 
of some legal significance later to change that position. Yet an 
adequate study of estoppel in the boundary cases cannot be made 
son, 348 Mo. 473, 154 S.W. (2d) 104 (1941). This analysis can ·be significant only on the 
assumption that the Missouri court would give some effect to acquiescence for less than 
the statutory period. If acquiescence must be for the statutory period in any case, mistake 
under this view becomes immaterial. In the Mothershead case the court referred only to 
long acquiescence. 
141 See note 103 supra. 
142 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §805 (1941); BIGELOW, EsTOPPEL, 6th 
ed., 602 et seq. (1913). 
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entirely out of context. References to other applications of the 
doctrine, particularly to the typical estoppel in pais, will be made 
where this seems helpful in discovering the courts' objectives in 
the boundary cases. 
Attention should be directed first to cases in which the prin-
ciples of estoppel in pais can be easily invoked. These are cases 
in which a landowner makes positive representations to his neigh-
bor about the location of their common boundary. Such cases 
stand somewhat apart from the objectives of this study, but 
they should not be passed without some comment. Where there 
has been a change of position in reliance on such representation, 
estoppel has almost invariably been applied.143 The change of 
position usually consists of erecting valuable improvements, but 
in a number of cases the mere purchase of land affected by the 
boundary was sufficient.144 It may be clear in the latter cases that 
the purchaser acquired his land believing that the boundary was 
as it was represented; but it is doubtful whether the proof shows 
that he would not have purchased but for the representations. 
No point has been made of this, however. The stated require-
ments of estoppel in pais include the requirement that the party 
making the representation shall have knowledge of the true facts 
or that the circumstances are sufficient to impute such knowledge. 
But it seems that this requirement is not always adhered to even 
in cases not involving boundaries.145 At any rate, in the boundary 
cases, although several courts have refused to estop a defendant 
who asserted a line with a good faith belief that it was the true 
boundary, 146 the scienter requirement has more frequently been 
143 Allyn v. Schultz, 5 Ariz. 152, 48 P. 960 (1897); Grants Pass Land and Water Co. 
v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914); Pitcher v. Dove, 99 Ind. 175 (1884); Ross v. 
Ferree, 95 Iowa 604, 64 N.W. 683 (1895); Martin v. Hampton Grocery Co., 256 Ky. 401, 
76 S.W. (2d) 32 (1934); Liederbach v. Pickett, 199 'Minn. 554, 273 N.W. 77 (1937); Small 
v. Robbins, 33 Nev. 288, 110 P. 1128 (1910); Clark v. Hindman, 46 Ore. 67, 79 P. 56 (1905); 
Merriwether v. Larmon, 35 Tenn. 447 (1856); Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245 (1863); Rippey 
v. Harrison, 66 Wash. 109, 119 P. 178 (1911); Haag v. Gorman, 203 Wis. 346, 234 N.W. 
337 (1931). Cf. Howell v. Kelly, 129 Kan. 543, 283 P. 500 (1930); Mowers v. Evers, 117 
Mich. 93, 75 N.W. 290 (1898). 
144Allyn v. Schultz, 5 Ariz. 152, 48 P. 960 (1897); Grants Pass Land and Water Co. 
v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914); Rowell v. Weinemann, 119 Iowa 256, 93 N.W. 
279 (1903); Merriwether v. Larmon, 35 Tenn. 447 (1856); Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245 
(1863); Rippey v. Harrison, 66 Wash. 109, 119 P. 178 (1911). Cf. Mowers v. Evers, 117 
Mich. 93, 75 N.W. 290 (1898). 
145 BIGELOW, ·ESTOPPEL, 6th ed., 663 et seq. (1913); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 
5th ed., §809 (1941). Pomeroy says that such a requirement is less likely to be imposed 
where estoppel is founded on affirmative conduct rather than mere acquiescence or 
silence, and that the result is an application of the two-innocent-persons doctrine. 
146 Cheeney v. Nebraska and C. Stone Co., (C.C. Colo. 1890) 41 F. 740; Quick v. 
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ignored.147 Of course where a plaintiff's change of position has 
not been in reliance on anytp.ing done or omitted by the defend-
ant, there is no room for estoppel.148 
A striking application of the doctrine has been made in cases 
involving only silence on the part of one landowner in the face 
of expenditures by his neighbor, which were made on certain 
assumptions by the latter as to the correct boundary.149 These 
cases are all the more striking because in most of them the es-
topped party shared the belief of his neighbor as to the proper 
location of their boundary.150 
The cases last considered may suggest that the courts in apply-
ing estoppel in boundary disputes are concerned with something 
more than the prevention of inequitable results in particular 
cases. They may serve as a transition into a larger mass of cases 
which are fully meaningful only in relation to the practical loca-
tion of boundaries by parol agreement or acquiescence. 
Mention has been made of some courts' use of estoppel to 
explain decisions on facts which show nothing more than typical 
practical locations by other accepted methods.151 There may be 
objection to such a practice on the ground that it distorts the 
meaning of estoppel. But certainly these are cases in which parties 
Nitschelm, 139 III. 251, 28 N.E. 926 (1891); Faulkner v. Lloyd, (Ky. 1952) 253 S.W. (2d) 
972. Cf. Pitcher v. Dove, 99 Ind. 175 (1884); Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245 (1863). 
147 Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398, 6 S. (2d) 326 (1942): Benz v. St. Paul, 89 Minn. 
31, 93 N.W. 1038 (1903); Small v. Robbins, 33 Nev. 288, 110 P. 1128 (1910); Clark v. 
Hindman, 46 Ore. 67, 79 P. 56 (1905); Louks v. Kenniston, 50 Vt. 116 (1877); Rippey 
v. Harrison, 66 Wash. 109, 119 P. 178 (1911). 
148 Keel v. Covey, 206 Okla. 128, 241 P. (2d) 954 (1952); Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wash. 
(2d) 512, 178 P. (2d) 965 (1947). Cf. Coming v. Troy Iron &: Nail Factory, 44 N.Y. 577 
(1871), in which recovery of land was allowed on the finding that it would not interfere 
with the defendant's valuable improvements. There will be no estoppel if the defendant 
did not know of the expenditures until after they were completed. Trimpl v. Meyer, 
246 Iowa 1245, 71 N.W. (2d) 437 (1955). 
149 Deidrich v. Simmons, 75 Ark. 400, 87 S.W. 649 (1905); Kerr v. Hitt, 75 III. 51 
(1874); Minear v. Keith Furnace Co., 213 Iowa 663, 239 N.W. 584 (1931); Corey v. Fort 
Dodge, 118 Iowa 742, 92 N.W. 704 (1902); McClintic v. f[)avis, 228 S.C. 378, 90 S.E. (2d) 
364 (1955). Cf. Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465, 45 P. (2d) 518 (1935); Tyree v. Gosa, 11 
Wash. (2d) 572, 119 P. (2d) 926 (1941), where such a result was not reached because the 
plaintiff verbally protested against the defendant's activities. Contra: Cottrell v. Pickering, 
32 Utah 62, 88 P. 696 (1907), where the court insisted on the strict requirements of 
estoppel in pais. Cf. Mullaney v. Duffy, 145 Ill. 559, 33 N.E. 750 (1893); Hass v. Plautz, 
56 Wis. 105, 14 N.W. 65 (1882); Warner v. Fountain, 28 Wis. 405 (1871). 
150 Cf. Dorfman v. Lieb, 102 N.J. Eq. 492, 141 A. 581 (1928), where the court said 
that equity will not relieve against a mutual mistake, but nevertheless ordered the 
defendant to convey ,to the plaintiff the land claimed by him upon payment by the latter 
of its value. 
151 See text at notes 47 and 127 supra. 
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who have taken a position are prevented from changing it; and 
reference can be made again to other applications of estoppel 
which do not meet the more precise requirements of estoppel in 
pais. The main objection to such a practice, however, is that it 
serves merely to cover a court's failure to bring to light the real 
ground for decision. A primary purpose of this whole study is 
to discover a rationale for practical location. If the concepts of 
parol agreements and acquiescence are not wholly adequate for 
this purpose, a resort to estoppel gets us no further. Particular 
reference should be made to an Alabama case in which there 
was an informal boundary agreement and the erection of a fence 
and acquiescence and possession in accordance with it for thirty 
years.152 The court invoked estoppel to prevent a denial of the 
validity of this boundary. This is of special significance because 
that court had not previously recognized boundaries by agree-
ment or acquiescence. If this case is followed, it may be possible 
to determine boundaries by either means in the guise of 
estoppel. 153 
Courts have invoked estoppel in favor of a landowner who 
changed his position in reliance on conduct by an adjoining 
owner, such as erecting a fence, indicating the latter's position in 
regard to their boundary.154 No representations were expressly 
made, but could be said to have been implied by conduct. These 
cases are referred to here, rather than in relation to the situation 
mentioned three paragraphs above, because of the difficulty in 
distinguishing them from other cases involving long mutual 
acquiescence in a boundary, but which also had the additional 
feature that one of the parties in each dispute made valuable 
improvements in reliance on the boundary acquiesced in, a fact 
152 Turner v. De Priest, 205 Ala. 313, 87 S . .370 (1921). 
153 In a group of early Tennessee cases it was held that where one takes a grant of 
unsurveyed land from the state and then marks out boundaries, these will be binding 
on the state and also by estoppel on the grantee in favor of his later grantees. Yal'borough 
v. Abernathy, 19 Tenn. 413 (1838); Singleton v. Whiteside, 13 Tenn. 18 (1833); Davis' 
Lessee v. Smith & Tapley, 9 Tenn. 496 (1831). This has been designated as the "remarking 
doctrine." Failure to meet even the minimum estoppel requirement of a change in posi-
tion in reliance on the marked boundary leaves such a rule as essentially no more than 
a special kind of practical location. A similar rule has been applied in North Carolina 
against a grantor who, at the time or after his conveyance, marks the boundaries of the 
land conveyed. Watford v. Pierce, 188 N.C. 430, 124 S.E. 838 (1924); Barker v. Southern 
Ry. Co., 125 N.C. 596, 34 S.E. 701 (1899). 
154 Hart v. Worthington, 238 Iowa 1205, 30 N.W. (2d) 306 (1947); Harper v. Learned, 
199 La. 398, 6 S. (2d) 326 (1942); Colby v. Norton, 19 Me. 412 (1841); Fitch v. Walsh, 94 
Neb. 32, 142 N.W. 293 (1913); Noble Gold Mines Co. v. Olsen, 57 Nev. 448, 66 P. (2d) 
1005 (1937); Morrison v. Howell, 37 Pa. 58 (1860); Hefner v. Downing, 57 Tex. 576 (1882). 
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which the courts regarded as bearing on the outcome.155 Of 
special interest are several New Jersey cases where the practical 
location of streets and lot lines consistent therewith, after long 
acquiescence and the making of improvements, became binding 
on the parties affected.156 The court said that acquiescence for 
the statutory period was not required, but initially did not apply 
the label of estoppel. At length the court indicated that this rule 
was not confined to cases involving streets and was indeed one of 
estoppel, 157 but reference was also made to the leading New York 
case on boundaries by acquiescence.158 New Jersey also has not 
otherwise recognized boundaries by agreement or acquiescence. 
The largest group of cases invoking estoppel are those which 
show practical locations by express or implied oral agreements, 
but with the added feature that one of the parties made valuable 
improvements in reliance on the line agreed on.159 In some of 
these cases there was also acquiescence for the statutory period;160 
but in others it is clear that a post-agreement period of acquies-
cence is not required.161 The Washington court ha~ expressly 
stated that an agreed line becomes binding either upon long 
acquiescence or the making of improvements in reliance on it.162 
The Wisconsin court in fact seems to recognize agreed boundaries 
only in terms of estoppel, with the making of improvements as 
155 Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 P. 1066 (1909); Midland Valley Railroad 
v. Imler, 130 Okla. 79, 262 P. 1067 (1927); Kier v. Fahrenthold, (Tex.Civ.App. 1957) 299 
S.W. (2d) 744. In the first two of these cases the courts did not use the word estoppel 
to characterize the result. 
156 Jackson v. Perrine, 35 N.J.L. 137 (1871); Smith v. The State, 23 N.J.L. 130 (1851); 
Den d. Haring v. Van Houten, 22 N.J.L. 61 (1849). 
157 Baldwin v. Shannon, 43 N.J.L. 596 (1881). 
158 Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359 (1857). 
159 Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App. (2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949); Acosta v. 
Gingles, 70 Fla. 13, 69 S. 717 (1915); Steidl v. Link, 246 Ill. 345, 92 N.E. 874 (1910); Bubacz 
v. Kirk, 91 Ind. App. 479, 171 N.E. 492 (1930); Cheshire v. McCoy, 205 Iowa 474,218 N.W. 
329 (1928); Evans v. Kunze, 128 Mo. 670, 31 S.W. 123 (1895); Trussel v. Lewis, 13 Neb. 
415, 14 N.W. 155 (1882); Jackson ex dem. Goodrich v. Ogden, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 238 (1810); 
Burt v. Creppel, 5 Ohio Dec. Repr. 330 (1875); Glasscock v. Bradley, (Tex.Civ.App. 1941) 
152 S.W. (2d) 439; Blackham v. Olsen, 51 Utah 124, 169 P. 156 (1917); Windsor v. Sarsfield, 
66 Wash. 576, 119 P. 1112 (1912); Pickett v. Nelson, 71 Wis. 542, 37 N.W. 836 (1888). 
Cf. Taylor v. Reising, 13 Idaho 226, 89 P. 943 (1907); Fisler v. Van Deusen, 158 App. 
Div. 322, 143 N.Y.S. 386 (1913). 
160 Bubacz v. Kirk, 91 Ind. App. 479, 171 N.'E. 492 (1930); Trussel v. Lewis, 13 Neb. 
415, 14 N.W. 155 (1882). 
161 Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App. (2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949); German 
v. Wilkin, 377 Ill. 515, 37 N.E. (2d) 155 (1941); Johnston v. -McFerren, 232 Iowa 305, 3 
N.W. (2d) 136 (1942); Diggs v. Kurtz, 132 Mo. 250, 33 S.W. 815 (1896); Burt v. Creppel, 5 
Ohio Dec. Repr. 330 (1875); Blackham v. Olsen, 51 Utah 124, 169 P. 156 (1917). 
162 Windsor v. Sarsfield, 66 Wash. 576, 119 P. 1112 (1912). 
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a necessary requirement.163 A few courts have denied estoppel in 
this situation because of the good faith, mistake, or lack of decep-
tion on the part of the party against whom estoppel was asserted.164 
The Wisconsin court ruled to the same effect, but in terms of 
the requirement of a dispute or uncertainty and the mistake rule 
in boundary agreements.165 But this restriction is not imposed by 
most of the courts which have applied estoppel either in the set-
ting of parol boundary agreements or of acquiescence. It may be 
inferred that where the circumstances are such as to call for es-
toppel, most courts are thereby also freed from the strictures of 
the mistake rule in boundary agreements. 
It will be seen that most of the estoppel cases require at least 
a substantial change of position by the party alleging estoppel. 
The presence in the facts of such a change of position adds an 
equitable ground for decision to whatever general policy may also 
be available and applicable in support of the practical location 
of boundaries. The designation as estoppel of the principle in-
volved may serve as a useful mark for classifying these cases on 
the basis of that special feature in them that is different from the 
common run of practical location cases. In this view, there is 
little point in inquiring whether estoppel in these cases is al-
together consistent with the ordinary principles of estoppel in 
pais. Objection to this use of the doctrine would have to center 
on the small emphasis which many courts place on the role of 
the party estopped. But the term "estoppel" may serve for lack 
of some other term which better conveys the meaning of what 
has been done. The decisions themselves are not objectionable, 
at least where the element of a changed position appears in addi-
tion to facts indicating a practical location by agreement or ac-
quiescence, for the latter facts alone would justify the decisions. 
Where there is a changed position in reliance on a line believed 
to be the true line, but without any other features of practical 
163 Peters v. Reichenbach, 114 Wis. 209, 90 N.W. 184 (1902); Hass v. Plautz, 56 Wis. 
105, 14 N.W. 65 (1882); Cove v. White, 20 Wis. 425 (1866), 23 Wis. 282 (1868). 
164 Proctor v. Putnam -Machine Co., 137 Mass. 159 (1884); Brewer v. Boston & Worces-
ter R,R., 46 Mass. 478 (1843); Ward v. Dean, 69 -Minn .. 466, 72 N.W. 710 (1897); 
Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925). In Cronin v. Gore, 38 Mich. 381 
(1878), the Michigan court said :that good faith was a defense when reliance was on the 
silence, rather than the representations, of a landowner. In Beardsley v. Crane, 52 
Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740 (1893), the Minnesota court stated its three-fold doctrine of 
practical location, one ground of which is estoppel, stated in terms requiring knowledge 
of the true line by the party estopped. 
165 Hass v. Plautz, 56 Wis. 105, 14 N.W. 65 (1882). See also Proprietors of Liverpool 
Wharf v. Prescott, 89 Mass. 494 (1863). 
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location, the decision will be justified in some cases by the pres-
ence of a representation, by words or conduct, by the party es-
topped. This is pretty close to orthodox estoppel in pais. There 
remain those few cases in which there is nothing to induce one 
party's change of position except knowledge by the other party 
that such change is taking place and then silence. Such decisions 
may be debatable. The willingness of some courts to reach them 
may reflect these courts' susceptibility to any available device for 
the expeditious determination of boundaries. If there were some 
simple, or at least clear, answer to the simple question, "Where 
is my boundary?" the courts might not feel the need to be so 
liberal with estoppel. At least the role of the party estopped has 
not been ignored altogether. Here, as in other areas of practical 
location, there must be some semblance of mutuality. The courts 
have yet to say that one can make out a case of practical location 
merely by proving that he unilaterally procured a survey and 
built a house accordingly. 
IV. OTHER RULES 
Description v. Survey 
In an earlier article166 an attempt was made to run down au-
thority for a proposition I had at times encountered to the ef-
fect that lines surveyed on the ground prior to a conveyance 
would control an inconsistent description in the deed based on 
such survey. There is no need to go into all this again, but since 
it savors of practical location, the rules encountered are here 
briefly stated. 
(1) One rule followed by a large number of courts concerns 
a description which incorporates a plat, and requires that, if the 
plat and the survey on which it was based conflict, the survey 
must control. There is no requirement that the survey be marked 
on the ground or that the parties know anything about it. Many 
of the cases, however, show such knowledge, and show that the 
survey in fact was marked, or other significant facts, such as re-
liance on it or acquiescence in it. Where these facts appear, the 
same decisions might have been reached by application of one 
or the· other of the doctrines of practical location already 
considered. 
(2) Several courts at an early date announced another rule 
like the first, but broader in scope. If a survey is made prior to a 
166J3rowder, "Boundaries: Description v. Survey,'' 53 'MICH. L. REv. 647 (1955). 
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conveyance, or the land intended for conveyance is otherwise 
designated on the ground, the lines so designated will control 
inconsistent calls in the deed. Here too it is not clear that the sur-
veyed lines must be visibly marked, that the parties to the deed 
must have participated in the survey, or even that they both must 
know of it. Nor is certain protection provided for subsequent 
purchasers who take without knowledge of the controlling facts. 
In some of its applications the rule seems to accomplish a refor-
mation for mutual mistake in the guise of construction. This 
rule is not generally followed, and its status is not clear in those 
states which at one time approved it. 
(3) Practical location by common grantor. This is a designation 
of a variant of the rule stated immediately above. It has crept into 
the decisions in several states. If, where a grantor seeks to divide 
his land into one or more parcels, he marks the dividing lines on 
the ground, such lines will control any inconsistent calls in the 
deed or deeds. Here too there is no clearly imposed requirement 
that a grantee participate in or know what the grantor has done. 
But in all of the cases the grantees either knew of the line at the 
time of the conveyance or there was such acquiescence in the 
line as to have constituted a practical location on the ground. 
In addition to the cases cited in the earlier article as opposed 
to these three rules, reference is also made to several cases which 
have approached the question on the basis of practical location by 
oral agreement, and which in effect are also opposed to the rules 
stated either on the ground that the survey was unilateral and not 
agreed to or acquiesced in;167 that, since the survey took place 
prior to the conveyance, the requirement of a dispute or un-
certainty as the basis for agreement could not be satisfied;168 or 
that an agreement prior to a conveyance merges in the deed.169 
Further comment on these rules appears below under the 
heading "VI. The Meaning of Practical Location." 
The Cooley Dictum 
In two early Michigan cases170 Justice Cooley asserted a prin-
ciple of practical location the exact basis for which was not made 
167 Ross v. Severance, 198 Wis. 489, 224 N.W. 711 (1929). 
168 Taylor v. Board of Trustees, 185 Ga. 61, 194 S.E. 169 (1937); Lake Geneva Beach 
Assn. v. Anderson, 246 Wis. 596, 18 N.W. (2d) 493 (1945). 
169 Hicks v. Smith, 205 Ga. 614, 54 S.E. (2d) 407 (1949). 
170 Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601 at 605 (1878) (concurring opinion); Flynn v. Glenny, 
51 Mich. 580 at 584, 17 N.W. 65 (1883). 
1958] LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES 527 
clear. He said that the principle applicable to conveyances by 
government survey should be applied generally; that is, the con-
trolling question is where the original landmarks were located, 
notwithstanding an inconsistent plat or any claim that they were 
located erroneously. Further, the best evidence of where they 
were located is the practical location made at the time the original 
monuments were presumably in place. For this reason old bound-
ary fences are the best evidence of lot lines. He said further: 
"It is also pure assumption that the original survey was math-
ematically correct. . . . Purchasers of town lots have a right 
to locate them according to the stakes which they find planted 
and recognized, and no subsequent survey can be allowed to 
unsettle their lines. The question afterwards is not whether 
the stakes were where they should have been in order to make 
them correspond with the lot lines as they should be if the 
platting were done with absolute accuracy, but it is whether 
they were planted by authority, and the lots were purchased 
and taken possession of in reliance upon them. If such was the 
case they must govern, notwithstanding any errors in locating 
them."171 
It is not clear from these statements how conclusive are lot lines 
which "were planted by authority," unless the lots also "were 
purchased and taken possession of in reliance on them." The first 
of these thoughts, the planting of lines by authority, comes close 
to the essence of practical location. It is a recognition of the un-
reliability of paper boundaries and the necessity for a practical 
location which, when made, becomes binding. If so, it is note-
worthy that Justice Cooley was able to see the practical location 
problem in terms other than those of parol agreements. The 
thought about purchasing and taking possession in reliance, how-
ever, smacks of estoppel, or perhaps acquiescence. In fact the 
doctrine of acquiescence was expressly asserted in both of the 
cases in which this dictum appears. And it is that doctrine which 
seems to have predominated in later Michigan cases in which the 
Cooley dictum has been cited.172 The present significance of this 
dictum apart from the acquiescence doctrine is doubtful. The 
171 Flynn v. Glenny, 51 Mich. 580 at 584, 17 N.W. 65 (1883). 
172 E.g., Escher v. Bender, 338 Mich. 1, 61 N.W. (2d) 143 (1953); Marion v. Balsley, 
195 Mich. 51, 161 N.W. 820 (1917); Veltmans v. Kurtz, 167 Mich. 412, 132 N.W. 1009 
(1911); Breakey v. Woolsey, 149 Mich. 86, 112 N.W. 719 (1907); Husted v. Willoughby, 
117 Mich. 56, 75 N.W. 279 (1898); White v. Peabody, 106 Mich. 144, 64 N.W. 41 (1895). 
• 
• 
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original Michigan cases have been cited by other courts, but not 
in support of the full import of the Cooley dictum.173 
The Rule of Lerned v. Morrill174 
Several early New England cases held that if a deed calls 
for monuments which have not been placed on the land at the 
time of the conveyance, but which are later so placed by the 
parties, the latter will be bound thereby, as if the monuments 
existed at the time of the conveyance.175 
An Omnibus Rule 
The Washington court on occasion has stated the require-
ments of practical location in terms of a combination of all the 
usual bases therefor, that is, if parties agree on a line and acquiesce 
in it for a long period and improvements are made with reference 
to it, they will be bound.176 The impression may be left that all 
these elements are required in any case, but other cases in that 
state show that an agreement acquiesced in,177 or acquiescence 
alone, 178 or estoppel179 are separate and sufficient grounds for 
decision. 
No Practical Location 
It may be interesting to note that, apart from arbitration 
agreements or the use of acquiescence as evidence of a boundary, 
courts in the following states have not recognized, either by 
decision or dicta, the practical location of boundaries by agree-
ment or acquiescence: Alabama,180 Maryland, Massachusetts,181 
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia. Several of these courts, 
173E.g., Flynn v. Glenny was cited in Turner v. Creech, 58 Wash. 439 at 443, 108 
P. 1084 (1910), in support of the practical location of boundaries by a common grantor, 
and in Richwine v. The Presbyterian Church, 135 Ind. 80 at 91, 34 N.E. 737 (1892), for 
the doctrine of boundaries by acquiescence. 
1742 N.H. 197 (1820). 
175 Knowles v. Toothaker, 58 Me. 172 (1870); Cleaveland v. Flagg, 58 'Mass. 76 (1849). 
Cf. Oliver v. Muncy, 262 Ky. 164, 89 S.W. (2d) 617 (1936). Contra: Cripe v. Coates, 124 
Ind. App. 246, 116 N.E. (2d) 642 (1954). 
176 Scott v. Slater, 42 Wash. (2d) 366, 255 P. (2d) 377 (1953); Mullally v. Parks, 29 
Wash. (2d) 899, 190 P. (2d) 107 (1948). 
177 Farrow v. Plancich, 134 Wash. 690, 236 P. 288 (1925). 
178 Denny v. Northern Pacific Ry., 19 Wash. 298, 53 P. 341 (1898). 
179 Rippey v. Harrison, 66 Wash. 109, 119 P. 178 (1911). 
180 Cf. Turner v. De Priest, 205 Ala. 313, 87 S. 370 (1921). 
181 Cf. the cases cited note 76 supra. 
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however, have recognized estoppel as a basis for the determina-
tion of boundaries.182 
V. STATUS OF SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS 
Relatively little has been said by the courts about the effect 
of practical location by agreement, acquiescence, or estoppel, 
upon the successors in interest of the original parties. Large 
numbers of cases in effect bind subsequent purchasers, but with-
out mention of the question. One reason for this may be the 
inability of such purchasers to make out a case on the usual facts 
for relief against the actions of their predecessors. That a practical 
location will bind the parties thereto and their privies is the 
usual assumption, and the only ground indicated for relieving the 
privies is their qualification as bona fide purchasers for value 
without notice of the located line. Accordingly it has been held 
that they will be bound if they had knowledge of the line;183 and 
they will also be bound by constructive or inquiry notice, which 
can be furnished by possession conforming to the line, 184 by mon-
uments marking the line,185 or by improvements consistent with 
the line.186 One court held that a difference in the grade of land 
and in the appearance of a sidewalk which crossed the line were 
sufficient.187 Cases without some such facts as these are not com-
mon; and if visible marking were required for practical location 
even as between the original parties, as it probably should be, the 
present problem would disappear. 
Some courts have decided that successors in interest are bound 
182 Cox v. Heuseman, 124 Va. 159, 97 S.E. 778 (1919). Cf. Turner v. De Priest, 205 
Ala. 313, 87 S. 370 (1921); New Jersey cases cited notes 156, 157 supra. 
183 Furlow v. Dunn, 201 Ark. 23, 144 S.W. (2d) 31 (1940); Kandlick v. Hudek, 365 
Ill. 292, 6 N .E. (2d) 196 (1937). 
184 Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 119 P. 893 (1911); Sheldon v. Atkinson, 38 Kan. 
14, 16 P. 68 (1887); Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 245 Ky. 234, 53 
S.W. (2d) 538 (1932); Thompson v. Borg, 90 Minn. 209, 95 N.W. 896 (1903); Box Elder 
Livestock Co. v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); '.Bartlett v. Young, 63 N.H. 
265 (1884). 
185 Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P. (2d) 351 (1954); Kinsey v. Sattertlnvaite, 
88 Ind. 342 (1882); Seberg v. Iowa Trust & Savings Bank, 141 Iowa 99, 119 N.W. 378 
(1909); Carver v. Turner, 310 Ky. 99, 219 S.W. (2d) 409 (1949); Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 
541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903); Thiessen v. Wortltlngton, 41 Ore. 145, 68 P. 424 (1902); Hagey 
v. Detweiler, 35 Pa. 409 (1860). 
186 Miller v. Farmers' Bank and Trust Co., 104 Ark. 99, 148 S.W. 513 (1912); Campbell 
v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 245 P. (2d) 1052 (1952); Houston v. Sneed, 15 Tex. 307 (1855); 
Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P. 1031 (1913). 
187 Concannon v. Blackman, 232 Iowa 722, 6 N.W. (2d) 116 (1942). Cf. Nitterauer v. 
Pulley, 401 Ill. 494, 82 N.E. (2d) 643 (1948). 
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without notice.188 Where the view is held that practical location 
is not a conveyance, but only the application of a description to 
the ground, a sort of construction of the deed,189 such a conclusion 
is at least understandable. One court simply said that otherwise 
the doctrine could not be effective.190 Where, after a boundary 
agreement, title to the parcels affected become united, it has been 
held that a subsequent grantee of one of the parcels takes accord-
ing to the terms of his deed unaffected by the agreement.191 
It is an assumed and unquestioned corollary to the practical 
location doctrine, or at least to any rule binding successors in 
interest, that the benefit of any such location also runs to suc-
cessors in interest.192 Such is the import of the frequent statement 
that when such a location has been effectively made, it attaches 
in legal effect to the deeds of the parties as though expressly 
described therein.193 It has been held that a party to a boundary 
agreement is estopped to deny it against a subsequent purchaser 
from him of his lot.194 
The similarity between the doctrine of acquiescence and 
adverse possession suggests the existence of a comparable tacking 
problem. It has not been regarded as a problem in the acquiescence 
cases, however, for it is scarcely ever mentioned, and quite gen-
erally it is tacitly allowed. One case has been found in which the 
question was mentioned, and the court there held that a succes-
sor in interest can tack his period of acquiescence to that of his 
predecessor .195 
VI. THE MEANING OF PRACTICAL LOCATION 
This dismal story of the courts' struggle to adapt inadequate 
doctrines to reach a laudable objective falls short of revealing the 
enorn;iity of the confusion which has been left in the wake of that 
188 Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949); McGill v. 
Dowman, 195 -Ga. 357, 24 S.E. (2d) 195 (1943) (applying statutory rule of acquiescence); 
Osteen v. Wynn, 131 Ga. 209, 62 S.E. 37 (1908); Kesler v. Ellis, 47 Idaho 740, 278 P. 
366 (1929) (although there was in fact a fence erected); Fisher v. Bennehoff, 121 Ill. 426, 
13 N.E. 150 (1887); Joyce v. Williams, 26 Mich. 331 (1873); Kincaid v. Dormey, 47 Mo. 
337 (1871); Welch v. Carter, 151 S.C. 145, 148 S.E. 697 (1929). 
189 Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949). 
190 Osteen v. Wynn, 131 Ga. 209, 62 S.E. 37 (1908). 
101 Patton v. Smith, 171 Mo. 231, 71 S.W. 187 (1902). 
192Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 95 P. 888 (1908). 
193 Hoyer v. Edwards, 182 Ark. 624, 32 S.W. (2d) 812 (1930); Edgeller v. Johnston, 
74 Idaho 359, 262 P. (2d) 1006 (1953); Kandlick v. Hudek, 365 Ill. 292, 6 N.E. (2d) 824 
(1937). 
194 Marchant v. Felder, 107 S.C. 516, 93 S.E. 179 (1917). 
195 Renwick v. Noggle, 247 Mich. 150, 225 N.W. 535 (1929). 
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process. Other stories could be told which would carry you to the 
outer reaches of limbo. Such would be the record of the efforts of 
individual courts to thread through the maze of available prece-
dents, compounding the confusion as they went. The trouble is 
that the courts have not been fully aware of what they are trying 
to accomplish, although they have often been aware of the prob-
lem in our conveyancing practice which makes the search for a 
solution imperative. We have seen the courts toil with agreements 
that are not essentially promissory, with a vague and variable 
concept of acquiescence, and with an uneasy kind of estoppel 
that at best copes with only a fringe of the problem. 
What then is the problem? It has been mentioned before. It 
is the gulf in our conveyancing between descriptions in deeds 
and boundaries on the ground. It is the impossibility by existing 
methods of so describing land that competent persons can, by 
using that description, be reasonably certain of locating its exact 
boundaries. This much has been understood. The California 
court has put it this way: 
"If the position of the line always remained to be ascertained 
by measurement alone, the result would be that it would not 
be a fixed boundary, but would be subject to change with 
every new measurement. Such uncertainty and instability in 
the title to land would be intolerable."196 
In an early Kentucky case the court answered an argument that 
proof of marked lines would amount to varying the record by 
parol proof, saying: 
"This would be true, if where a line is described by its course 
only, a mathematical line . . . either according to the true 
meridian or the magnetic variation were intended; but it is 
apprehended that this is a misconception of the true meaning 
of such a description of boundary. Such a line was never 
run in making any survey, and is impossible to be ascertained 
with perfect precision and certainty by any human means."197 
What then is to be done? It would be best simply to prevent 
the problem from arising by so conveying land that no hiatus 
would occur between the execution of a deed and the application 
of the boundaries described to the ground. The feasibility of such 
an expedient is considered in the succeeding section. How can 
196Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477 at 481, 95 P. 888 (1908). 
197 Cowen v. Fauntleroy, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 261 (1810). 
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the gap be bridged in the case of existing titles? If there is no 
certain application of a description to the ground, the much-sought 
"true" line is a myth. If a court rules in favor of a line on the 
ground, it becomes the boundary, not because the true line has 
necessarily been found, but because the parties are left no other 
choice. Controversy here, as elsewhere, must come to an end. 
Our objective, therefore, should not be to discover better means of 
locating the true line, but to discover a process for running a 
line by one so authorized that his action will be conclusive. Bound-
ary litigation of-course is such a process. But the rules discussed 
herein have been evolved largely for the purpose of avoiding 
litigation of every boundary question. Except where conflicting 
titles are involved, the problem is not adversary in nature, and 
the process of solving it should not be forced int6 an adversary 
form. The process is essentially administrative or ministerial. 
Someone should simply be authorized to apply the description 
to the ground. Call it a determination of fact if you wish. Justice 
Cooley must have had some such idea in mind when he uttered 
his dictum on this problem, which was quoted above.198 
At any rate the authority conferred to locate some line would 
not be authority to locate any line, but would at least require a 
reasonable effort to apply the description and other relevant 
data to the ground. This would imply the need for standards 
or safeguards to insure that this was done. But once done within 
the standards imposed, it would be conclusive, or as close to being 
conclusive as any administrative determination can be. At least 
it would not be subject to attack simply because someone else, 
proceeding similarly at a later date, reached a different result. 
It would also be necessary that a line so run be appropriately 
marked or monumented, for if we are left with only an imaginary 
line, we are no better off than we were to begin with. There are, 
therefore, two essential ingredients for practical location: (1) an 
application of a description to the ground by one competent to 
do so, and (2) an appropriate marking of lines so run. 
A possible explanation for the failure of courts explicitly to 
reach the core of practical location may be the impossibility of 
expressing its meaning except in terms that seem paradoxical. We 
insist on the guiding force of the muniments of title, and yet that 
we must cut free of them. We say, on the one hand, that the only 
true guide for a practical location is in the applicable muniments 
198 See note 170 et seq. supra. 
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of title. But once made, we say that the muniments of title have 
fully performed their office and must thereafter remain in the 
background, not to be later resurrected to impeach the operation. 
If this process is administrative, it would seem to follow that it 
should be performed by an administrator. Whether some such 
procedure could be devised as to be effective upon the existing 
state of titles is another question reserved for discussion below. 
No such procedure, at any rate, is generally available today. The 
point to be made here is that the suggested analysis may be used 
to characterize much of the practical location of boundaries as 
this has been accomplished under the rules previously considered. 
When the courts apply their rules relating to boundary agree-
ments or acquiescence, are they not really allowing the interested 
parties themselves to undertake the administrative process of ap-
plying their titles to the ground? In this view, practical location 
should not be explained in either contractual or conveyancing 
terms, and some meaning is supplied to the conclusion previously 
made that boundary agreements are essentially sui generis. If the 
courts approached the problem in this way, they might avoid the 
confusion which has resulted from their attempts to adapt concepts 
which are inadequate. It is on this basis that "practical location" 
has been used throughout this article as a generic term to cover 
the several approved methods for the determination of bound-
aries. It is the only term in existing usage which carries the real 
meaning of this process. The Minnesota court, it may be noted, 
has cast its rules in the framework of this terminology.199 
Until some more satisfactory method of practical location has 
been provided, the courts must work with the rules they have. It is 
desirable, therefore, briefly to examine those rules again to de-
termine the extent to which they may be explained in terms of 
the theory of practical location offered here and whether the 
various features of those rules are consistent with the objectives 
of that theory. 
Parol Agreements 
Except in the arbitration-type of case, where the usual princi-
ples of arbitration alone may suffice, boundary "agreements" 
should be regarded simply as practical locations by the mutual 
199 Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740 (1893). The court said that practi-
cal location may take three forms: (1) acquiescence for the statutory period, (2) agree-
ment afterwards acquiesced in, and (3) estoppel. 
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assent of the parties affected. It should be possible to manifest 
such assent formally or informally, expressly or impliedly, by 
words or other conduct. In most of the cases the line agreed on 
has been marked by fences and the like or other monuments, 
but the courts have not often insisted on this as a requirement. 
Mutual possession according to the line has often been found 
sufficient. Physical marking of a line on the ground is of the es-
sence of practical location, and the security of the operation calls 
for the requirement of some sort of physical marking. It should 
not be necessary that the line be marked before or concurrently 
with the parties' expression of assent to it. They should be able 
to assent to a line previously marked for some other purpose. 
The cases require that parties shall not, in the guise of a 
boundary agreement, attempt a parol transfer of land. Although 
we may wish to avoid contractual or conveyancing concepts, 
this requirement of the Statute of Frauds, under any theory of 
practical location, can scarcely be avoided. If the argument is 
made that any practical location which departs from the "true" 
line is in effect a conveyance, the answer, of course, lies in the 
unreality of any true line which has not yet been located. A 
proper practical location is not essentially a conveyance, but it 
is obvious that a conveyance can be made in the guise of a prac-
tical location. Hence the requirement of due respect for the rel-
evant documents of title. If a line is to be deemed located by 
the parties' assent to it, should they be required to act only on 
the basis of an acceptable survey? This would tend to insure 
against a deliberate· attempt to disregard the line described in 
their deeds, as well as against a haphazard and careless operation. 
In many cases this procedure was followed, but the courts have 
shown no inclination to require it. Can the parties' interest in 
protecting the integrity of their respective titles when they man-
ifest their mutual assent to a boundary be relied on as an adequate 
substitute for the standards which would otherwise be required 
in such a procedure? Perhaps it can, but only within limits that 
would guard against their deliberate attempt to change their 
boundary. It may not be possible to define a general test for tliis 
purpose, but particular criteria may be available. It could be 
held, for example, that the parties exceeded their authority where 
they located a line in the face of another obvious line, previously 
located, or located one which was in obvious conflict with their 
documents of title. Within such limits, their good faith may be 
the only test. Putting the requirement in terms of doubt or un-
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certainty over the true line as a basis for agreement is likely to 
prove more confusing than helpful. 
It is in connection with the reliability of the parties' conduct 
that the post-agreement requirements which the courts have 
imposed become significant. Presumably they are imposed to 
guard against hasty and ill-considered action. It is clear that, with 
but a few possible exceptions, the courts will not allow a boundary 
to be determined merely by a verbal manifestation of the parties' 
assent to it. Most courts require subsequent acquiescence in the 
line located or assented to, either for the period of the statute 
of limitations or some indefinite period which may be less than 
the statutory period. This surely provides a reliable safeguard, 
for it allows ample opportunity for the discovery of error, as 
well as for either party simply to change his mind. It is especially 
indicated where assent has been given to a line previously marked. 
What about the more liberal rule of some courts which requires 
merely that an agreement be "executed"? For a reason previously 
mentioned, it may not be enough to allow a practical location 
to be consummated merely by acts of possession, although some 
courts have held this sufficient. Suppose execution is held to 
require merely the physical marking of the line. Maybe this 
should be enough. While statements of parties as to their bound-
ary may not be reliable, and are subject to misunderstanding, 
it may be assumed that they will not lightly erect barriers or 
other monuments which normally signify the limits of ownership. 
But a party should be free to prove that a fence was built for 
some other purpose than to mark a boundary. Whether the erec-
tion of a fence should raise a presumption of an intention to make 
a practical location is a debatable question, the answer to which 
may depend on how highly a court regards the policy favoring 
practical location. To be significant for any purpose, physical 
markings of a line must be mutual, which means either that 
both parties must participate, or that the acts must be performed 
by one with the provable assent of the other. It is at this point 
that the outcome of litigation will depend less on proper legal 
analysis than on a careful weighing of the variable facts of par-
ticular cases. 
The assumption that a mutual manifestation of assent to 
a line may be a reliable substitute for an administrative location 
of a boundary meets its acid test in the mistake rule which has 
been so often asserted by the courts. We have seen in the better 
reasoned cases that the courts will not in every instance listen 
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to an argument that a mistake was made in running a line on 
the ground. Where a boundary is located by the judgment of a 
court, it is not later subject to collateral attack on such a ground. 
Nor presumably would it be so if it were located by an adminis-
trator acting under authority conferred by law. Nor should it 
be so in the arbitration-type of case where it is located under au-
thority conferred in advance by the parties themselves. But what 
about the typical case in which a surveyor is authorized to run 
a line, but without authority to bind the parties, whose assent 
to the line comes after it has been run? Paraphrasing the argu-
ment sometimes made by courts, can the parties be held to have 
fixed a boundary when their only purpose was to find it? The 
answer is obvious, but the question is not fair. If all that has taken 
place is a survey, this is not or should not be a practical location, 
even if the parties thereafter verbally assent to it as showing the 
boundary. Practical location takes place when the parties execute 
their agreement upon the line as a boundary by physical mark-
ings or acquiescence or both. It may be argued that if we are 
to regard such action as a substitute for a practical location by 
an arbitrator or a court or an administrator, it should appear 
that they intended so to act. But such intention need not be 
explicit. It should be enough if they then regarded the location 
of their boundary as settled and not conditional upon some future 
determination by someone else. There is no justification for 
implying any such conditional attitude on the basis of a later 
assertion that the "true" line was somewhere else. This is es-
pecially so where their initial conduct has been followed by a 
required period of acquiescence. The only realistic significance 
that an allegation of mistake can have is that the parties would 
not have acted if they had known the surveyed line was erro-
neous. But neither would a court or an administrator acting for 
them in a proceeding initiated by them. In this sense, the argu-
ment rests on the illusion of the existence of some "true" line 
which can always and certainly be found if properly sought. The 
mistake rule in effect comes down to denying that the parties can 
do for themselves what others can do for them. Whether the 
parties can be relied on fully to guard their respective interests 
when they manifest their assent to a boundary, whether such 
assent is a good substitute for the safeguards that would be pro-
vided in a judicial or administrative operation, may be a debat-
able question. But the question should be faced in these terms. 
If the announced policy in favor of the informal and extra-
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judicial resolution of boundary problems is strong enough to 
require an affirmative answer, there is no room left for any ques-
tion of mistake. It is significant that mistake has not been held 
to be material where the parties, without a survey, or to avoid a 
survey, undertake to set their boundary. But such a practical 
location seems less teliable and less worthy of legal recognition 
than the more common case where the parties act only after 
an attempt has been made in good faith to apply their paper 
titles to the ground. 
The mistake rule may have been derived in part from the 
contractual theory of practical location, with its implicit require-
ment of consideration, which is satisfied only by something like 
an express submission to arbitration. This merely demonstrates 
the inadequacy of contractual concepts in attaining the real ob-
jectives of practical location, for it removes from the compass 
of that doctrine those cases which most deserve to be included 
within it. Within its proper framework, any thought of a bargain 
or of consideration is irrelevant. 
If the analysis of practical location offered herein is valid, 
the courts are not so wide of the mark when they say that the 
effect of a valid boundary agreement is not to transfer land in-
formally, but is only to fix the location where the estate of each 
party is supposed to exist, so that they continue to hold the areas 
agreed on by their existing titles. 
Acquiescence 
If it can be misleading to speak of practical location in con-
tractual terms, it can be equally misleading to speak of acquies-
cence merely as evidence of an agreement. But we probably have 
to recognize at least two kinds of practical location. In the one 
case the mutual manifestation of assent to a line on the ground 
as a boundary appears in something of the guise of a transaction, 
identifiable in point of time. This is the one sense in which it 
is like an agreement. Here we may well speak of acquiescence 
as the passive conduct which some courts say must follow. If, 
on the other hand, the required manifestation of assent does 
not appear in this form, but appears only in a blend of active 
and passive conduct over a period of time, it may not be amiss 
to speak of such circumstances as a practical location by acquies-
cence. Indeed, it would be preferable to confine the term "bound-
ary by acquiescence" to cases of the latter type. In any event, these 
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two kinds of cases should be separately identified so that the dif-
ferences between them can be understood. 
In the absence of proof of acquiescence of the first type men-
· tioned above, the objective facts in an acquiescence case will 
often be of equivocal significance. Where a fence or other barrier 
has existed throughout the required period of time, with per-
haps no proof of the circumstances of its origin, but without 
proof of conduct by the parties on either side of it inconsistent 
with its acceptance as a boundary monument, it may be permis-
sible to infer or presume that the erection and preservation of 
the fence was with assent to or in recognition of it as a boundary. 
Either party would have leave to rebut such a presumption, 
such as by evidence that the fence was intended to serve a dif-
ferent purpose, or that he did not believe that it marked the 
true line. The same result, of course, would be indicated where 
a fence has been erected by one party and treated by him as a 
boundary, but without any manifestation of the other party's 
position except his possession in conformity to it. 
Where acquiescence merely consummates an othenvise prov-
able practical location, the normal requirements of the latter 
will, of course, be applicable. Mistake should be immaterial, the 
line should be marked on the ground, and the parties should not 
be allowed to change their boundary in the guise of a practical 
location. No reason is seen for not imposing the same require-
ments where practical location is by acquiescence in the second 
sense mentioned above. For example, to determine a boundary 
by acquiescence in a fence which either party knew was not locat-
ed on the true line would provide a means of altering a bound-
ary, and so in effect of conveying land, informally. The courts 
in fact have not made much use of the mistake rule where they 
have chosen to speak of practical location in terms of acquies-
cence. But neither have they imposed a requirement of marking 
the boundary. And there is doubt about how generally they will 
insist upon their requirement of "doubt" or "uncertainty" about 
the true line. Explanation for this may again lie in some of the 
current notions of acquiescence as a kind of prescription. This 
is a rationale quite different from practical location as that term 
is used herein, which is keyed to the application of a written de-
scription to the ground. A prescriptive location of a boundary, on 
the other hand, is essentially the abrogation of a paper title. In 
this view, therefore, absence of certain of the requirements for 
practical location becomes immaterial. 
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We are left with the question, however, whether there is a 
need for a more liberal doctrine of prescription. It is clear that 
the courts are not content to remain within the confines of ad-
verse possession. But it may be doubted that three doctrines are 
required for the adequate solution of this kind of problem. Cer-
tainly less confusion would arise if we used only two. Under 
this view, the courts would either require proof of adverse posses-
sion or confine the parties within the essential limits of practical 
location. 
Use of the period of the statute of limitations as the period 
required for acquiescence has the advantage of simplicity. But 
this period varies among the states from five to twenty-one years. 
If the one period seems too short or the other too long, there is 
an alternative which has received judicial recognition: an in-
definite period, the length of which can be made to depend on 
the nature of the proof of acquiescence in the particular case. It 
may be noted that most courts prefer the indefinite period for 
acquiescence as a post-agreement requirement and the definite 
period where the boundary, as we may say, is located by acquies-
cence alone. This is not unreasonable. 
Estoppel 
There is no need to resort to estoppel to explain an ordinary 
practical location. Most of the cases, however, involve facts to 
which both doctrines may be relevant. This is most obviously the 
case where the usual elements of practical location are present, 
but in addition one party has substantially changed his position 
in conformity to the line located. In the case where one party 
changes his position in reliance on representations, by word or 
conduct, of his neighbor, the ordinary elements of practical loca-
tion are not obvious. But may not even this pattern of behavior 
in fact manifest the mutual assent required for practical loca-
tion? The making of improvements should be the best sort of 
evidence of at least one party's assent. In any case, however, such 
a change of position raises an equity in favor of the party making 
it which is not present in every practical location. Whether or 
not this meets the typical requirements of estoppel, whether or 
not the opposing party, for example, labored under a bona fide 
but mistaken belief as to the boundary, the courts hold that this 
equity is controlling. It would be difficult to contend against this 
view. Other features of practical location then assume less im-
portance. In this situation, any requirement that a line be marked 
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or that the parties cannot ignore an established boundary need 
not be imposed. 
Where then the elements of practical location are present, 
but are fortified by a change of position, the result may be de-
scribed in terms of either doctrine. Or the term "estoppel" might 
be reserved for convenience to those cases where the usual ele-
ments of practical location are absent. 
Description v. Survey-An Addendum 
A few further comments are in order on several rules, pre-
viously considered herein and in an earlier article, all of which 
in effect provide that a line established by a survey prior to a 
conveyance becomes, as a matter of construction, the line called 
for by the deed, notwithstanding a conflict between them. This 
is practical location in reverse. In some courts' view, it is not 
practical location at all, presumably because a line cannot be 
located which does not yet exist. But no substantial reason is 
seen why a line may not be located before as well as after a con-
veyance which purports to describe it. An ordinary practical 
location presupposes a good faith attempt to locate a line pre-
viously described. An application of the present rules should 
require a good faith attempt to describe a line previously located. 
Such a requirement may have been assumed in the adoption of 
these rules, but in stating them the courts often fail to require 
that the line be marked on the ground or that protection be 
afforded to subsequent purchasers without knowledge of the 
line, not to speak of the failure to specify that the location of the 
line be the mutual act of both the original parties. A rule so 
stated fails to provide even the minimal requirements of practical 
location. Many of the cases, however, show that such require-
ments were in fact met. In some of them, for example, there was 
acquiescence in a marked line. In all of these cases the parties 
to the transaction are grantor and grantee, who are left with a 
common boundary. Since the conveyance follows the location of 
the line, the grantee often accepts his deed in reliance on the 
line run on the ground, and sometimes follows this by making 
improvements. In such a case the doctrine of estoppel as it has 
been developed in the practical location cases may be invoked. 
It would be preferable, therefore, if the courts would simply 
adapt the principles of practical location or estoppel to these 
special circumstances, and cease trying to explain their decisions 
in terms of these inadequate and misleading rules. The existence 
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of these rules further reflects the failure of courts to perceive the 
essential nature and ingredients of practical location. 
It has been recognized that where a deed fails to describe the 
line which was run, the remedy of reformation of the deed may 
be appropriate. Certainly there are cases in which this would 
be the best remedy. But to try to explain all of the cases in such 
terms is again to make the assumption that a boundary can always 
be described so as to indicate its exact location on the ground. 
This of course is the root of the problem which the principles 
of practical location were designed to overcome. There is some 
sense, therefore, in treating the problem in most circumstances 
as one of construction, controlled by the practical construction 
provided by the parties. 
VII. THE LESSON OF PRACTICAL LOCATION 
Although the existing rules of practical location can probably 
be brought into such order that they can alleviate the deficiencies 
of our conveyancing practices, they still will leave much to be 
desired in providing for landowners who seek to know with cer-
tainty their boundaries. This article has been pointing to the 
discovery of some better means of reaching this objective. 
I should say to begin with that I know of no panacea. But I 
am prepared to suggest a few remedies, the effectiveness of which 
will depend on the extent to which they overcome the inertia 
of existing practices and procedures. 
The ideal solution would be to preclude discrepancies be-
tween descriptions in deeds and boundaries on the ground by 
appropriate conveyancing practices. It may seem to some that 
this could be accomplished by devising better methods of describ-
ing land. Some specific suggestions of this sort have been made.200 
There is another alternative: do not try to describe land at all. 
Or rather, use a description to identify land in a general way, 
and fix the boundaries by specific reference in the description 
to lines marked on the ground. This is not a novel idea. It is the 
established practice in conveying government-survey land. The 
trouble with that method is that the government survey was not 
marked beyond sections and major fractions thereof, and many 
of the monuments have long since disappeared. Authority should 
200 Keith, "Government Land Surveys and Related Problems," 38 IowA L. REV. 86 
(1952). 
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be conferred by statute to survey and adequately mark any parcel, 
however small. Indeed the smaller the parcel the more practi-
cable such a method becomes.201 An official surveyor could be 
provided for this purpose, or authority could be conferred on 
any competent surveyor chosen by a grantor. In either case the , 
surveyor would be required to mark the land intended for con-
veyance by placing at designated intervals distinctive, official 
monuments. He might be required to file in an appropriate office 
any maps or field notes prepared by him. But the deed of such 
land would conclude with the words, "according to official sur-
vey thereof," or the like. It could be made a misdemeanor for 
anyone to disturb monuments so planted. 
Such a procedure would bind grantor and grantee and their 
privies, but it could not determine boundaries against the claims 
of their non-participating neighbors. This is the principal limita-
tion on the usefulness of such a device. But the present proposal 
could be given effect without this difficulty in respect to the in-
ternal boundaries of divided land holdings. It would be most ap-
propriate where land is platted and subdivided, and where much 
of the proposed procedure is now followed. Those courts which 
hold, in the case of platted land, that the survey controls the plat, 
but without the safeguards suggested here, are making an abortive 
effort to reach the proposed objective. 
There is some question about the extent to which this pro-
cedure could be made compulsory. There would be no little dif-
ficulty in getting it adopted as a requirement for all conveyances 
by which land is divided or subdivided. It might most hopefully 
be proposed as an addition to the usual administrative require-
ments for platting land. Anyone at all familiar with the cases on 
practical location by the parties will be inclined to favor a con-
siderable degree of compulsion in the institution of a less hap-
hazard procedure. But even if its use were left entirely voluntary, 
some improvement in the condition of boundaries might be noted 
in time. 
The practical location of existing boundaries presents a larger 
and more difficult problem. But it could be approached in much 
the same way. Any landowner should be able to locate his bound-
aries by some simple, inexpensive, and expeditious means, and 
to know that the boundaries so located cannot thereafter be im-
201 By the same token, the larger the tract, the more difficult become the problems 
in using such a method. But we are not dealing with panaceas, and the small tracts 
outnumber the large. 
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peached. He should be able to call upon a surveyor who is au-
thorized to perform this task on the basis of the appropriate muni-
ments of title and to mark the boundaries so located by official 
monuments. Provision for notice to other landowners affected 
by this process would have to be made unless they participated in 
initiating it. The surveyor probably would have to certify to what 
he had done and file his records of the operation. The location of 
a boundary could become conclusive upon the filing of the cer-
tificate if the interested parties joined in executing it, or it could 
become conclusive after the lapse of a specified period if no ob-
jections were filed within that period. If any objections were 
properly registered, this could have the effect simply of abrogating 
the results, but preferably would be the foundation for judicial 
review, in which presumably the survey would at least be prima 
facie evidence of the boundaries sought. In the event a conflict of 
titles developed, a judicial proceeding, of course, would be the 
only solution. Once the boundaries of a parcel were established, 
and in the absence of a conflict of titles, the owner could convey 
it by its existing description. It would be preferable, however, as 
in the case where a grantor and grantee are the only parties in-
terested, that a later description be couched in terms of the official 
survey. It would be even more preferable to require that this be 
done. 
This proposal too is not novel. There are statutes in several 
states which, in varying degrees, provide such an administrative 
procedure.202 No attempt will be made here to explain or compare 
them or to evaluate their particular provisions. The Indiana 
statute resembles most closely the present proposal. The Oregon 
statute is patently inadequate. Nor has any investigation been 
made to learn how much they have been used and to what effect. 
There are relatively few cases in Indiana on practical location 
by the parties, but it is not known whether the statutory pro-
cedure has had anything to do with this. In Indiana and Oregon 
the statutory procedure has not been regarded as exclusive,203 and 
in Louisiana boundaries have been located by estoppel.204 
We may suspect that it would take more than a legislative 
202 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1951) §§49-3311 to 49-3314; La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) arts. 
823 to 855; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1955) §§209.160 to 209.180. Cf. ID. Stat. (1957) c. 133, §11 et 
seq.; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §73.190 et seq. 
203 Adams v. Betz, 167 Ind. 161, 78 -N.E. 649 (1906); Horton v. Brown, 130 Ind. 113, 
29 N.E. 414 (1891); McCully v. Heaverne, 82 Ore. 650, 160 P. 1166 (1917). 
204 Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398, 6 S. (2d) 326 (1942); Selfe v. Travis, (La. App. 1947) 
29 S. (2d) 786. 
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enactment to initiate any widespread use of an administrative 
procedure for locating boundaries. The inertia of habitual attitudes 
and practices may suggest the need for some special inducement. 
A provision might be included withdrawing from use all or part 
of the rules relating to practical location by the parties, on the 
ground that if a better method is available it ought to be exclu-
sive. 
Short of an administrative method of practical location, legis-
lation might be considered which would reduce practical location 
by the parties to the simplest possible operation consistent with 
its reliability. It ~ight be provided that all such practical locations 
be based on a survey by a competent surveyor, which, if accepted 
by the parties, should be marked by distinctive monuments au-
thorized for the purpose. The necessity would remain. for proof 
that such marking was done by both parties or with their consent. 
In the absence of bad faith, it might be necessary to preclude any 
later claim that such a mutual marking was not consistent with 
the survey on which it was based. A requirement of acquiesence 
in such a boundary for a prescribed period might be imposed, 
although this does not seem indispensable. 
Under the latter proposal it may be doubted whether any 
room would be left for a separate doctrine of "boundaries by 
acquiescence." Consideration would then have to be given to 
the need for such a doctrine. 
These proposals are offered with some diffidence and without 
any effort to spell out all the necessary features of any compre-
hensive and efficient legislative enactment. Nor is it assumed that 
legislation of this sort would solve all boundary problems. It is 
hoped merely that the need for improvement in present practices 
has been demonstrated and that there are those who will rise to 
meet it. It is hoped that, under appropriate auspices, a study of 
this problem by title lawyers, surveyors, and other interested 
persons, will somewhere and somehow be undertaken. We lawyers 
have too long assumed that this was a matter of concern only to 
surveyors until a dispute arises. We have too long washed our 
hands of it in our title opinions by telling our clients that their 
boundaries are a matter on which they must satisfy themselves, 
knowing full well that they probably will do nothing at all unless 
compelled by other interested parties, or that such satisfaction 
as they may gain will likely prove illusory. Surely we can bring 
our conveyancing practices into such order that we can escape 
the reproach that a man cannot know his boundaries. 
